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I. INTRODUCTION
"[We] recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern
Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or
both ......
Ambiguity, sovereignty, and identity have all played roles in both the
evolution of the Republic of Ireland and in the peace process in Northern
Ireland. The meaning of Irish nationhood, its contrast to British nationhood,
and the degree to which persons identifying themselves with each category
have formed the basis of conflict and have frustrated its resolution for at least
three-quarters of a century. In 1921, the Irish partition created the "Free
State" in the South as a dominion of the British Empire. 2 For those who view
sovereignty as absolute and indivisible, it is notable that the Free State was
not sovereign at birth. However, the ability of the Free State's leaders to run
its own affairs, and within three decades transmute the state into a republic,
demonstrated a gradual capture of sovereignty from the British Crown. The
subtlety and ambiguity of this transition likely diffused British opposition to
it at any single historical point. By 1949, it was an irreversible political fact.3
During the years of the Free State's ambiguous evolution into a fully
sovereign republic (1921-1941), the state of Northern Ireland, by contrast,
suffered from pernicious clarity.4 One was either Catholic or Protestant,
nationalist or unionist. One was either loyal to the United Kingdom or
desired reunification with the South. One either believed that Ireland should
be sovereign over the six counties of the North or that the United Kingdom
should be. It was the unionists-the persons who believed they were British
and should remain part of the British state-whose clear, unambiguous
position prevailed. In fact, Great Britain had created the political unit of
* Professor

of Law, West Virginia University; J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A.
Temple University. The author thanks Bertha Romine and Polina Gaal for their
invaluable help in producing this article.
1 THE AGREEMENT: AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS 2
(1998) [hereinafter THE AGREEMENT]. This multi-party agreement among the various
political groupings and governments signed on April 10, 1998, at Belfast is variously

known as the Belfast Agreement, the Stormont Agreement, the Good Friday Agreement
(GFA), and The Agreement.
2 D. GEORGE BOYCE, IRELAND 1828-1923: FROM ASCENDANCY TO DEMOCRACY
102-03 (1992).

3DANIEL WEBSTER HoLLIs III, THE HISTORY OF IRELAND 166 (2001).
4 DAVID McKITTRICK & DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES: THE
STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 4-7 (2002).
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Northern Ireland on their behalf. Under the "Stormont" system of
government, "the other"-the Irish, the nationalist, and the Gaelic-were
excluded from power, effectively disenfranchised. 5 The dominant unionists
could not envision sharing that power without compromising the clarity of
their vision, their British identity, and the sovereignty of the Crown.
Only after the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 25 years of the
violent Troubles 6 did the need for benevolent ambiguity prevail. This article
examines how ambiguous treatment of sovereignty and identity has been
necessary to gain peace in Northern Ireland. This necessity has been
recognized in the power-sharing arrangements of the Good Friday
Agreement and its language about identity and tolerance.
While necessary for peace-making and visible in the implementation and
elaboration of the Good Friday Agreement, we must now ask whether the
ambiguity is useful or obstructionist in peace-building.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY

Blair: IRA Failureto Disarm Hinders Pact7
The Irish Republican Army's failure to disarm and renounce
violence fully remains the major barrier to reviving a CatholicProtestant administration in Northern Ireland, British Prime Minister
Tony Blair said Thursday.
Blair, speaking in London, said the recent electoral triumph of
the IRA-linked Sinn Fein and Protestant hard-liners from the
Democratic Unionist Party made it more important than ever for the
IRA to deliver clear peace commitments.
"There was a time in Northern Ireland when ambiguity was a
necessary friend. It is now an enemy, an opponent, of this process
working," Blair said. "It's got to be clear. After 51/2 years of the Good
Friday agreement, you cannot expect people to sit down in
government unless they are all playing by the rules."...8
5 On the outskirts of Belfast, Stormont is the location of the legislature and other
government offices of Northern Ireland. It has become a place-metaphor that stands for
the system of unionist rule.
6 See infra note 112 and accompanying text (referring to troubles).
7 This excerpt is taken from Shawn Pogatchnik, Blair: IRA Failure to Disarm
Hinders Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 2004, availableat http:llwww.boston.comnews/
world/europe/articles/2004/01/15/blair ira failure to disarm_hinderspact (last visited
Oct. 25, 2004).
8 Id. (emphasis added).
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On the day before the conference at Ohio State, which this symposium
issue memorializes, Tony Blair asserted in the British press that the time for
ambiguity in the Northern Irish peace process was past.9 What did he mean
by this? Is lack of clarity ever a good thing in conflict resolution-and at
what point does it turn bad? Why had it now turned bad in Mr. Blair's
estimation? Ambiguity, trust, and misunderstanding riddle Northern Ireland.
How was the 1998 Good Friday Agreement possible after hundreds of years
of conflict, outrage, and mistrust? Why has implementation of the Agreement
stalled after five years, with the two major communities in the North
appearing to polarize (at least at the ballot box) rather than reconcile?
Ambiguity sometimes allows two competing sides to maintain differing
views of the future, while apparently negotiating agreement on that future.
The course of the Oslo peace process for the Middle East, as well as the Irish
Good Friday process, reveal the tactic of suppressing incompatible
intentions. Views of history usually differ even more profoundly than those
of the future, and probably underlie divergent prospective visions.
Consider the Glorious Revolution. While teaching International Human
Rights Law, I have for years presented the Glorious Revolution of 1689 and
the resulting English Bill of Rights as landmark progressive events.
Parliamentary democracy triumphed over Stuart absolutism. 10 Civil liberties
were guaranteed." The stage was set for the American and French
Revolutions, and the template was set for the Declaration of Independence,
the U.S. Bill of Rights, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen. John Locke's liberal democratic philosophy took concrete political
12
form for the first time.
The nationalist community sees itself as the victim of colonization for
the better part of a millennium, beginning with the first English invasion of
Ireland in 1169 by Anglo-Norman nobles and that of Henry II two years
later. 13 (Nationalists do use the word "colony" to describe Ireland's status,
although the British tend to reject that characterization by pointing out that
colony was never the island's legal status under the British Empire.)
The worst of the colonial repression occurred in the centuries following
9

Id.

10 HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN CwILZATION: 1600-PRESENT 7 (John A. Maxwell et
al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
11 Admittedly, I would warn my students that such rights were not immediately
granted to all segments of the population, whether in England, America, or France.
12 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 17-18.
13 MAIRE O'BRIEN & CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, IRELAND: A CONCISE HISTORY 41-52

(1992).
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the Protestant Reformation, when British empire-building combined with
religious division and zeal. The English finally consolidated their rule over
Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 14 Oliver Cromwell, whom
mainstream history seems to treat with mixed approval (perhaps responsible
for this treatment in some measure was his role in entrenching the power of
Parliament to resist monarchical despotism, even if he was a bit fanatic and
despotic himself), is viewed by the Irish to have been Hitler-like in his evil.
Upon defeating the Irish in the early 1640s, Cromwell's troops engaged in
significant massacres. 15 After the slaughter, Cromwell's forces divested the
Irish of much land, awarding it to his British officers as a new Anglo-Irish
nobility.' 6 For the next three centuries, these new lords would depend on the
support and import of a Protestant peasantry (and later working class)
brought to the north of the island as colonists from the Scottish lowlands and
from England.
Again, mainstream Anglophone history resonates discordantly with Irish
perceptions. In the late 1600s, the English Parliament continued the struggle
that had lasted most of that century against Stuart absolutism.1 7 The two
Charleses and two Jameses had indeed sought to limit Parliament's power
and thus the growth of representative democracy. Emerging Enlightenment
philosophers such as John Locke gave philosophical foundation to the
politics of parliamentary power. A religious element enhanced the conflict
through the seventeenth century, in varying degrees, depending on the tenor
of the times and whether the particular James or Charles was merely a high
Anglican, a closet Catholic, or an overt Catholic-the latter being most
offensive to the Puritan-leaning parliaments. Push came to shove when the
parliamentary party encouraged the Dutch Prince of Orange, William, to
wrest the English throne from James II.18 William, along with his Protestant
and parliamentary supporters, was successful at ousting James II from power.
On Britain itself, the "revolution," which was rather bloodless, gave birth to
the English Bill of Rights and entrenched representative democracy with its
14 Id. at 61-76.

15 See Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty:
The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1062-63
(1996); see also HOLLIs, supra note 3, at 56-57.
16 O'BRIEN & O'BRIEN, supra note 13, at 68-69.
17 See generally Louise Halper, Measure for Measure: Law, Prerogative,
Subversion, 13 CARDozo STUD. L. & LIT. 221 (2001); Michael W. McConnell, Tradition
and ConstitutionalismBefore the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 173 (1998); Laura
Zwicker, The Politicsof Toleration: The Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration
Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773 (1991).

18 Laycock, supra note 15, at 1065.
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Enlightenment foundations-hence the term "Glorious."' 19
The Irish did not share in the glory. First, the war between the Jacobites
and the Williamites shed more blood on their soil than in Britain. The forces
battled at Derry (Londonderry), on the Boyne, at Aughrim, and elsewhere in
Ireland. 20 Nationalists do not remember William as a champion for
representative democracy, human rights, or the Enlightenment. Whatever
may have been (or became) the case in England itself, Williamite victory
brought with it no native Irish representation in the emerging British
democracy; in essence, it was an extinguishment of their political, cultural,
and economic rights, and laid the grounds for future tribal taunting and
hegemony by Ulster Protestants quite unenvisioned by Lockian political
thought.
Profound tension over the "Marching Season" harkens back to this
historical ambiguity. The unionist community celebrates the events of 1689,
particularly the Battle of the Boyne (where the forces of William definitively
defeated those of James) and the siege of Derry (where a semi-mythical band
of Protestant craft apprentices purportedly saved the population from
slaughter at the hands of the Stuart army by bravely rushing to close the city
gates in the nick of time). 2 1 Each July, loyalists march through the streets of
Northern Ireland celebrating these victories. The marchers claim to be merely
honoring their history and tradition. Nationalists condemn the marches as
triumphalist taunting-a ceremonial boot on the neck. 22 The fact that the
parades wind through now Catholic neighborhoods aggravates the insult. The
Marching Season, with its dramatic historical resonances, has precipitated a
23
major portion of recent years' tension in Ulster.
Such fundamentally contradictory interpretations of history must remain
unsettled, but uncontrolling for a peace process to work. Tony Blair probably
understood this historical irreconcilability when he made his observation
about the time for ambiguity having past. But while ambiguity of belief may
never pass, what must go is the ambiguity of promised action. Sinn Fein is
19 Id.

20 HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 63-64.
21 See, e.g., NEIL JARMAN & DOMINIC BRYAN, PARADE AND PROTEST: A DISCUSSION
OF PARADING DISPUTES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 15-17 (1996); Dominic Bryan, Problems
of Religious Nationalism: ParadingProtestants and Consenting Catholics in Northern
Ireland: Communal Conflict, Contested Public Space, and Group Rights, 5 CHI. J. INT'L

L. 233, 237 (2004); Brian P. White, Walking the Queen's Highway: Peace, Politics and
Paradesin Northern Ireland,1 SAN DEGO INT'L L.J. 175,209-10 (2000).
22 Kelly Conlan, Note, The Orange Order Looks to the FirstAmendment: Would It
ProtectTheir Parades?,17 J.L. & POL. 553,557-60 (2001).
23 Id.
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Blair's target here. IRA disarmament was promised in the Good Friday
Agreement. 24 In exchange for disarmament they received some profound
gains, chief among them shared government and the recognition of an Irish
national right of self-determination.
But the IRA has not disarmed. It has submitted sporadically to an opaque
"inspection" system administered by an apparently weak-willed Canadian
soldier-diplomat who has confirmed some IRA munitions have been put
"beyond use" without clarifying what that ambiguous phrase means and
25
without providing the evidence for his conclusions.
If ambiguity is no longer called for, when was it so? Blair implicitly
recognized the crucial need for ambiguity in reaching a peace agreement in
April 1998. Unionists, fearing domination and discrimination at the hands of
an all-island Catholic majority, insisted on a document that protected the
current status of the union with Great Britain as long as a majority of voters
in the North supported that status. 26 Thus, the first paragraph of the
"Constitutional Issues" section of the GFA reads, "The participants... will:
recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority
of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they
prefer to continue to support the Union with great Britain or a sovereign
united Ireland."'27 The second paragraph, however, reads:
The participants... will: recognise that it is for the people of the island
24 According to the Agreement,
[a]ll participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of
all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work
constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any
influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms
within two years following endorsement in referendums North and South of the
agreement and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement.
THE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 20.
25
PAUL DIXON, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE POLITICS OF WAR AND PEACE 269-74
(2001); Dan Keenan, ConfidentialityAgreement Means General Can Only Hint at Extent
of IRA's 'Third Act', IRISH TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Itimes File; David Sharrock & George Jones, General May Go over Failure of IRA to
Disarm, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), July 3, 2001, at 8, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Telegr File.
26
ROGER MACGINTY &JOHN DARBY, GuNs AND GOVERNMENT: THE MANAGEMENT
OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 42-49 (2002); McKrrrRICK & MCVEA,
supra note 4, at 218-25; Brendan O'Leary, Has Gerry Adams Signaled What Sinn Fein
Really Wants?, SCOTSMAN, July 24, 1997, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Scotsm File.
27 THE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
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of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and
without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on
the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to
bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right
must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and
28
consent of a"majority of the people of Northern Ireland.
Such recognition of an island-wide Irish national right of selfdetermination was necessary to get Sinn Fein to agree to the document; it
was also important, of course, to the Irish Republic and to the SDLP (at the
time the largest N.I. nationalist political party). These two paragraphs were
both the cornerstones and the foundational ambiguity of the Good Friday
Agreement. How could the Irish nation possess a right to all-island selfdetermination at the same time the unionist community possessed the right to
insist on the current union with Britain by holding an electoral majority in the
six northern counties? True, rights are almost never absolute (cf.free speech,
where one is not permitted to yell "Fire!" in a crowded theater). In this case,
however, such an explanation leaves one dissatisfied. Sure, rights are not
absolute. However, these two rights, each foundational to the Agreement,
approach mutual exclusivity. A margin of psychological ambiguity, perhaps,
allowed each side to focus on its negotiated victory. Nationalists could savor
the victory of the British recognition of one Irish nation inhabiting the entire
island with entitlement to rule it. They could rationalize the electoral veto
over unification held by the Protestant majority in the North as a transient
power; demographics would change it as Catholics increased their population
proportion and successful coexistence might even bring a share of the
Protestant community to the cause of unification.
On the other hand, unionists could focus on their right of selfdetermination, guaranteed at the polls, and believe that they would not be
forced into an undesired unification for the foreseeable future. 29 (Most proagreement Unionists probably have a different expectation of the
28 Id.
29 Anti-Agreement unionists, i.e., loyalists, were less sanguine about protection of
their right under the document and about the demographic future. DIXON, supra note 25,
at 12-14. See generally CHANGING SHADES OF ORANGE AND GREEN: REDEFINING THE
UNION AND THE NATION IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND (John Coakley ed., 2002)
[hereinafter CHANGING SHADES]. See also John Coakley, ConstitutionalInnovation and

PoliticalChange in Twentieth-Century Ireland, in CHANGING SHADES, supra, at 1, 26-27
[hereinafter Coakley, ConstitutionalInnovationl; John Coakley, Conclusion: New Strains
of Unionism and Nationalism, in CHANGING SHADES, supra, at 132, 144-146 [hereinafter
Coakley, Conclusion]; David Ervine, Redefining Loyalism, in CHANGING SHADES, supra,
at 57, 57-63.
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demographic future than most nationalists. They might be right; while the
Catholic birthrate is higher, so is the emigration rate of Catholics.)
Furthermore, human rights guarantees within the document should ease
the fears of all groups (except perhaps for fringe loyalists and republicans).
Here Europeanization has probably played a role. The European Convention
for Human Rights protects all citizens of both the Republic and the United
Kingdom under international law. The Good Friday Agreement promises to
solidify such protections further by incorporating them into domestic law in
the North30 and possibly in the Republic:
The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the
protection of human rights in its jurisdiction. The Government will, taking
account of the work of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the
Constitution and the Report of the Constitution Review Group, bring
forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection
of human rights. These proposals will draw on the European Convention on
Human Rights and other international legal instruments in the field of
human rights and the question of the incorporation of the ECHR will be
further examined in this context. The measures brought forward would
ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will
pertain in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Irish Government will:
* establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit
equivalent to that within Northern Ireland;
* proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the
Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities
(already ratified by the UK);
• implement enhanced employment equality legislation;
* introduce equal status legislation; and
* continue to take further active steps to demonstrate its respect for
31
the different traditions in the island of Ireland.
Thus, the Catholics can expect a final end to the systematic
discrimination suffered in the North under the Stormont system.
Reciprocally, Protestants are protected against discrimination should the
electoral balance in the North tip toward reunification and they find
themselves a minority in a united Ireland. (It is true that not all unionists trust
such protections-but a significant enough proportion did to allow the Good
Friday Agreement to be approved, even by a majority of northern Protestant
voters.)
30 THE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 16.
31 Id. at 17-18.
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But Tony Blair was not referring primarily to such ambiguity of
conflicting foundational rights in his January 21 remarks. He was referring to
a narrower ambiguity of results promised in the decommissioning language
of the Good Friday Agreement. Having been one of the architects of an
edifice of. compromise and creative ambiguity, Blair should not have been
surprised that the IRA/Sinn Fein would continue to play the politics of the
vague (even regarding the fact that Sinn Fein is the political expression of the
IRA). After all, republicans had already won the concession on the principle
of self-deterrmination. 32 That was a horse out of the barn. The British could
not take that back, regardless of the status of IRA munitions. At most, the
British and the unionists could continue the delay of the power-sharing
government for Northern Ireland. The IRA figured that as long as they
vaguely employed language of disarmament (i.e., "beyond use"), they could
fix blame on the British and unionists for stalling the peace process.
As a result, in the November 2003 elections for representatives to a
Northern Ireland Assembly that was not sitting due to the ongoing impasse,
each community, nationalist and unionist, moved to its respective extremes.
This gave dominance for the first time to Protestant loyalists (the DUP) and
republicans (Sinn Fein) at the expense of the moderates from both
33
communities that had led the Good Friday compromises.
I.. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: THE AGREEMENT

The Agreement of April 1998 signed by the British and Irish
governments and multiple parties in Northern Ireland is variously known as
the Good Friday Agreement, the Belfast Agreement, and simply The
Agreement. There seem to be nationalist overtones in the name "Good Friday
Agreement," although it is not exactly clear why. Good Friday is certainly a
Catholic holiday, but for that matter it is also a Protestant holiday. Similarly,
why Protestants would have a preference for "Belfast Agreement" as its title
is equally obscure. Both Catholics and Protestants reside in that city. In any
event, the title is one of the many linguistic ambiguities that threads its way
through the fabric of this conflict.

32 McKrrrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 187-191, 196-99, 220-21.

33 Mark Hennessy, Robinson Transfers Give DUP Second Seat to Match UUP, IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2003, at 31, available at LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File; Dan
Keenan, MajorShock for SDLP but SF Puts in Effective Performance, IRISH TIMES, Nov.
28, 2003, at 10, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File.
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IV. HISTORY 1
Ireland's transition to democracy has spanned decades and centuries. It is
peculiar, perhaps unlike any other democratic transition due to its protracted
length, its bifurcation, and its emergence within an already democratic state
(the United Kingdom).
Democratic transition in Ireland erupted with the first great wave of
34
democratic revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The 1798 "United Irishmen" Revolt led by Wolfe Tone drew inspiration
35
from the American and French Revolution that preceded it by a few years.
Successful Latin American rebellions would sweep colonialism from most of
the Western Hemisphere a few years later. In half a century of democratic
revolutions, between 1775 and 1825, the Irish attempt was notable for its
36
lack of success.
Tone's failed revolt led to an immediate transition away from
38
democracy. 37 The British government shut down the Dublin Parliament.
39
All self-rule ended, and governing power was transferred to Westminister.
It would remain fully there until the Irish rebellion of the early twentieth
century. Of course, the limited home rule that had existed in the eighteenth
century under the Dublin Parliament was only that of a principally AngloIrish aristocracy. 40 However, given the electoral reform within Westminster
itself in the 1830s, where more Britons gained the right to participate in the
34 Native Irish had resisted a British role prior to this, of course, in many a war and
rebellion over the centuries. The 1798 rebellion was the first in the liberal democratic
mode. See generally Walter J. Walsh, Redefining Radicalism: A Historical Perspective,

59 GEO. L. REv. 636 (1991).
35 HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 80-84.
36 BOYCE, supra note 2, at 7-11. Of course, the United States and most of Latin
America won independence from their European colonial rulers during these fifty years,
and the French successfully overthrew their monarchy in 1789. The Irish rebellion in
1798 was unfocused, disorganized, and unsuccessful.
37 The revolt represented the last serious alliance of native Irish Catholics and Scots
Presbyterians against the English elite. Reduced discrimination against the nonconformist Presbyterians and land competition with the Irish caused the Scots-Irish to
realign with the English. HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 80-83; O'BRIEN & O'BRIEN, supra
note 13, at 89-92.
38
See K. THEODORE HOPPEN, IRELAND SINCE 1800: CONFLICT AND CONFORMITY
13-14 (1989); CHARLES TOWNSHEND, IRELAND: THE 20TH CENTURY 3 (1998). This act of
merging the Irish and British Parliaments was known as the Act of Union.
39 HOPPEN, supra note 38, at 14.
40
See D. GEORGE BOYCE, NATIONALISM IN IRELAND 95-96 (3d ed. 1995); see also
BOYCE, supra note 2, at 5.
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selection of their representatives, it might have been expected (had the
Dublin Parliament, continued) that a legislature on the island itself would
have meant eventual participation and earlier participation of the Catholic
majority in the self-government. Instead, the nineteenth century saw an
almost total disenfranchisement of the majority of Irish people from the
governing of their island.4 1 One might wonder whether the Potato Famine
that devastated Ireland in the middle of that century would have had such
harsh results had native Irish people, as well as the Anglo-Irish and ScotchIrish elites, controlled events on the island.
After the Potato Famine and a failed revolt in 1848, Irish nationalism
took at least three forms-Fenianism (probably the earliest form of
42
republicanism), a constitutional home rule movement, and cultural revival.
Interestingly, many of the leaders of these Irish national movements in the
late nineteenth ,century included members of the Protestant elite, such as
Charles Stewart Parnell on the political front and W. B. Yeats on the cultural
43
front.
One of the peculiarities of this long struggle, this long transition to
democracy, was that it occurred within an already democratic structure. The
United Kingdom was, by the late nineteenth century, a democratic state.
Ireland sent representatives to the Westminister Parliament, which was
responsible for directly governing the island, 44 but democratic structure does
not guarantee democratic result. The franchise was still sufficiently limited in
the nineteenth century and the Irish seats sufficiently few in number that
participation within British democracy did not mean for the bulk of Irish
participation in democracy for themselves. 45, Few Irish peasants could afford
to stand for Parliament, let alone travel to London and maintain themselves
there. Landlordism still dominated the economy of a mostly rural Ireland,
leaving the Catholic peasantry politically weak, as well as economically
vulnerable. 46 Nonetheless, unlike pure colonies of Britain in Africa or Asia at
the time, nineteenth century Ireland was legally an integral part of the United
Kingdom with representation at Westminster. Thus, the rebellion to come in
41 See 21

THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA

1012-13 (15th

ed.

1992)

[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA]; HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 89-90.
42 See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 107-10, 116.
43 Id. at 110, 116-17.
44 See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 41, at 1012; BOYCE, supra note 2, at
62.
45 CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, PARNELL AND His PARTY: 1880-90, at 11-13 (1957);
MARCUS TANNER, IRELAND'S HOLY WARS 206-07 (2001). See also BOYCE, supra note 2,
at 62-63.
46 O'BRIEN, supra note 45, at 13-20; TANNER, supra note 45, at 206.
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anti-colonial revolts in that it
the early twentieth century was unusual among
47
was a rebellion within a democratic state.
From its beginnings, Irish nationalism has contained inherent
ambiguities. Did the nationalism include only Catholics or did it include the
Protestant population as well? Certainly at times it included both groups, and
some of its leadership was from the Protestant community at critical points in
history. 48 Did the nationalism preclude continuation under the British crown?
Up until World War I, the predominant strand seemed to assume some sort of
continuing link with Britain and the loose-knit movement ambiguously
referred to as "home rule." 49 That phrase seemingly implies self-government
within a limited sovereignty. In fact, the home rule movement had finally
50
achieved some legislative success by the beginning of the Great War.
For decades, the Liberal Party (and its prime ministers, when in power)
tended to favor some sort of Irish home rule, which would have at least
included a return to a Dublin parliament. When conservative governments
came to power during this era, they tended to pull back from such a move.
However, by 1914, the Westminister Parliament had committed itself to Irish
home rule, a commitment interrupted by the outbreak of World War 1.51
Many Irish troops fought in that conflict, Protestant and Catholic alike. The
shipyards at Belfast, dominated by Protestant labor, were a main source of
armament for the British Navy. A small, armed revolt during Easter Week
1916 by Irish republicans who were not willing to wait for the war's end, nor
to remain part of the British Empire, resulted in the broadening of a second
current of Irish nationalism, more turbulent than the stream in which home
rule flowed-republicanism. This serious rift and the serious ambiguity in
Irish nationalism continues to this day between gradualists and absolutists.
For decades there has been an ebb and flow, as these two streams compete
for dominant position. Before Easter 1916, the current represented by the
republican extreme was shallow and narrow. However, British overreaction
to the Easter Rebellion, and particularly the summary execution of the
leaders of the revolt enraged the Irish public, horrified much of the rest of the
world, and birthed a popular following for uncompromising republicanism,
47 This was a democratic state, albeit a multinational state, with a semidisenfranchised Irish minority.

48 For example, Henry Grattan was a Protestant political leader of Irish Parliament
during legislative independence. See HOLUS, supra note 3, at 78-88.
49
See generally ALAN O'DAY, IRISH HOME RuLE 1867-1921, at 22-58 (1998).
50

See BOYCE, supra note 2, at 87-88; THOMAS HENNESSEY, DIVIDING IRELAND:

WORLD WAR IAND PARTITION 1-2 (1998).
51 HENNESSEY, supra note 50, at 76-77.
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52
particularly among the Catholic population.

Easter 1916
I have met them at close of day
Coming with vivid faces
From the counter or desk among grey
Eighteenth-century houses.
I have passed with a nod of the head
Or polite meaningless words,
Or have lingered awhile and said
Polite meaningless words,
And thought before I had done
Of a mocking tale or a gibe
To'please a companion
Around the fire at the club,
Being certain that they and I
But lived where motley is worn:
All changed, changed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born.
Too long a sacrifice
Can make a stone of the heart.
O when may it suffice?
That is heaven's part, our part
To murmur name upon name,
As a mother names her child
When sleep at last has come
On limbs that had run wild.
What is it but nightfall?
No, no, not night but death.
Was it needless death after all?
For England may keep faith
For all that is done and said.
We know their dreams; enough
To know they dreamed and are dead.
And what if excess of love
Bewildered them till they died?
I write it out in a verse MacDonagh and MacBride
And Connolly and Pearse
Now and in time to be,
52

See JOSEPH M. CURRAN, THE BIRTH OF THE IRISH FREE STATE 1921-1923, at 12-
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Wherever green is worn,
Are changed, changed utterly:
53
A terrible beauty is born.

From the Easter Rebellion on, the more extreme tenor of the nationalist
movement likely gave credence to the extremist faction within the Protestant
community in the North, whose sense of besiegement seemed more
legitimate in the face of a radical Irish Republic than with the mere prospect
of self-rule inside a British Empire. 54 The movement probably made it
difficult for Protestant supporters of a united and self-governing Ireland to
even a voice or find anyone to listen to their voice, even though such
Protestants had often been heard at earlier moments of the national
movement.
Between the Easter Rebellion of 1916 and the formation of the Irish Free
State in the South in 1921, the twentieth century's first era of Irish
"Troubles" was characterized by confusing alignments and enmities: Irish
fought British; Irish Protestants fought Catholics, both north and south.
When it finally became clear that Irish republicans could not win full military
victory against the British and the armed Protestant unionists in the North,
gradualists and absolutists within the nationalist community went to war with
each other in the Irish Civil War of 1922 to 1923. 55 Nationalist leader
Michael Collins signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty with the British in 1921; this
treaty allowed for partition of the island into a "Free State" in the 26 counties
of the South and a Protestant-dominated state in the northeast which would
remain part of the United Kingdom. Anti-treaty forces not willing to settle
for anything less than a united, all-island Irish Republic attacked the protreaty forces politically and militarily as sellouts and traitors. 56 This civil war
within Ireland was not between Protestants and Catholics but between
53
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Catholics and Catholics.
With the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the creation of the Irish Free
State, Ireland's democratic transition became a split one.57 The South first
became a self-governing part of the British Empire as a "dominion," like
Canada or Australia at that time. 58 After the pro-treaty forces prevailed in the
civil war, the development of democracy in the Republic of Ireland and that
in the six counties of the North followed different tracks. 59
V. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: ULSTER

Unionists often refer to the state in which they live, Northern Ireland, as
"Ulster." The active use of this term shows an ambiguity that I have not
heard unionists actually discuss. It raises the question of whether their
purported "nation" is Great Britain or an entity called Ulster. Nationalists, on
the other hand, eschew the use of "Ulster" to refer to the teriitory that is now
part of the United Kingdom in northeast Ireland. They also avoid "Northern
Ireland" as a description of a state. They prefer to refer to the land as the "Six
Counties," with the implication that some day, when unification occurs, these
six counties will join their 26 counterparts in the South to unite the island.6°
(Also seemingly acceptable is "north of Ireland" or "the North.") Nationalists
point out that Ulster was never merely the six counties that presently make
up Northern Ireland. Ulster was one of the four major provinces of historic
Ireland, but it included nine counties, not just these six. Three of the counties
of old Ulster were detached at the time of partition because their Catholic
populations Would have made the assurance of a Protestant majority in

57 The British Parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, dividing
the island into Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of
December 1921 established the former as the Irish Free State. See TOWNSHEND, supra
note 38, at 105-13 (1999).
58 See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 41, at 1013-14; TANNER, supra note

45, at 291.
59

See generally HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 133; McK1TrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4,
at 5; O'BREN & O'BRIEN, supra note 13, at 144-52. The South gradually evolved from a
British dominion to an independent but sectarian republic between the early 1920s and

the late 1940s. Such sectarianism arguably limited its full transition to democracy during
these early years of stepwise independence from Britain. On the other hand, the six
counties remain part of Great Britain and its democratic structure, but lack true
democracy because of the domination of the Stormont Protestant elite. See generally
infra Part VI.
60 See Jennifer Todd, The Reorientation of ConstitutionalNationalism, in CHANGING
SHADES, supra note 29, at 71, 73-76.
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61
Northern Ireland less certain.

VI. HISTORY 2

The pro-treaty party that won the Civil War initially governed the Free
State. 62 This is understandable as anti-treaty forces rejected the very notion
of a non-unified Ireland. The Irish Republican Army 63 rejected the Free State
64
and, in fact, was outlawed by it as well as by the United Kingdom.
Interestingly, some relatively moderate anti-treaty forces did enter the
political process within self-governing southern Ireland by the late 1920s. In
1932, these forces came into power as the Fianna Fail Party. 65 What were
they governing? They were governing a dominion of the British Empire
which they did not accept. As a result, Fianna Fail steered the evolution of
southern Ireland away from Britain.
In 1937, a constitution was drafted in which the British Crown was
nowhere mentioned; however, nothing was formally done to remove Ireland
from the Empire. 66 The Free State was renamed Eire, Gaelic for Ireland, and
the Constitution laid claim to sovereignty over the entire island. 67 The British
did nothing to contest the constitution, perhaps because a new war with
Germany was on the horizon. Eire did not participate in that war, but instead
held back as a neutral. 68 Within a few years of the war's end, in 1949,
southern Ireland declared what was already a reality-that it was, in fact, a
69
republic and had no further ties with the British Crown or Commonwealth.
During the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, Ireland, the southern state, made a
more-or-less successful transition to democracy. By the late 1940s, it had two
major political parties: Fine Gael and Fianna Fail.70 Fine Gael was the
successor to the original pro-treaty forces from the 1920s and Fianna Fail the

61 DIXON, supra note 25, at 4; McKrrrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 4-5.
62 See O'BRIEN & O'BRIEN, supra note 13, at 153.
63 The IRA has had numerous incarnations over the years. Thus, the one active in
1921 at the time of partition is not the same organization that exists today.
64 HOPPEN, supra note 38,.at 180.
65 TOWNSHEND, supra note 38, at 129-34.
66 Id. at 144-46.
67 See id.

68 Id. at 151-52.
69 O'BRIEN & O'BREN, supra note 13, at 160.
70 The Labor Party has at times played a role as a third party in Irish politics as a
partner in coalition government.
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partial successor to the anti-treaty forces. 7 1 Interestingly, by the late 1940s
their policies were strikingly similar. In fact, it was pro-treaty Fine Gael, the
original compromisers, Who were in power when the Irish Republic was
declared in 1949. And while the anti-treaty Fianna Fail grew closer in
appearance and -policy to its historical enemy, pro-treaty Fine Gael, it grew
apart from its one-time anti-treaty allies, the militant republicans. In fact, for
years Fianna Fail presided over the government of the Republic of Ireland
that outlawed the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein. 72 So was Fianna Fail
in fact a constitutional, nationalist party just like Fine Gael? Or did it
continue to be a republican party like Sinn Fein? Such ambiguity continues
to this day, and a now-legalized Sinn Fein competes with Fianna Fail for
republican electoral support in the South of Ireland, just as it competes
73
against the constitutional nationalist party SDLP in the North.
In the six counties of the North, the bifurcated transition to democracy
took the form of the Stormont system in which Unionists totally dominated
political and public life in Northern Ireland behind a democratic,
parliamentary fagade. 74 But such democratic form was belied by its
discriminatory result. Because of legislative gerrymandering as well as the
decision to reject proportional representation, after partition, the Catholic
community in the North was almost totally disenfranchised from political
power. 75 Through the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, Catholics in the North
sometimes looked southward for political support in a struggle to fight such
discrimination, however, they received little support. While the Nationalists
in the South proclaimed in their 1937 Constitution a right to rule all of
Ireland, in practice they seemed to have little interest in engaging the
Protestant majority in the North in any conflict. Periodically, northern
Nationalists would make attempts at reform within the established electoral
and bureaucratic system, but they were unsuccessful. 76 By the 1960s, the

Ireland, MSN ENCARTA, available at http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia
761566701_5/Ireland.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). Sinn Fein/IRA also would claim
successorship to anti-treaty forces of the 1920s.
72
Irish Republican Army, MSN ENCARTA, available at http://encarta.msn.com/
encyclopedia_761575144/IrishRepublicanArmy.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
73 See Coakley, Constitutional Innovation, supra note 29, at 1, 19, 26-28;
Perspectiveson the Future of Northern Ireland, in CHANGING SHADES, supra note 29, at
71

155-57.
74 See DIXON, supra note 25, at 67-69. Stormont is the locale where the legislature
sits.
75 Id.
76
McK1TIRICK & MCVEA,supra note 4, at 7-13, 21-25.
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Catholic community in Ulster was underrepresented in the legislature, the
executive, and the bureaucracy, and it received less than its share of
employment, housing, health, and other benefits made available through the
77
government.
One might wonder how in democratic, twentieth-century Britain,
apparently democratic structures could be used in such an undemocratic way.
A number of factors were at work. First, the six-county mini-state of
Northern Ireland could be regarded itself as an artificial, undemocratic
creation. The historic province of Ulster actually included nine counties but
the three counties of western Ulster were carved away from Northern Ireland
because that would have threatened the clear Protestant majority in the new
territory. 7 8 So, for example, the city and county of Donnegal, predominately
Catholic and historically part of Ulster, was not made part of, Northern
Ireland. Second, the voting system employed in Northern Ireland was a "first
past the post" system similar to that in the rest of Britain. It was a "majority"
9
system (in contrast to a proportional representation system).7
Both systems are found in various parliamentary democracies. However,
the proportional representation system is better suited to situations in which
there is a permanent minority whose interests are under-represented in a
parliament made up of single districts where minority candidates lose out to
those from the majority community. In the first Northern Irish elections, even
though the Catholic population represented a third of the six counties, it was
only able to elect a much smaller proportion of delegates. 80 Essentially,
Catholic interests in the Northern Ireland assembly could be permanently
ignored.
The politics of domination made this situation even more inequitable.
The Protestants in power gerrymandered the electoral districts so that even
81
fewer nationalist representatives were sent to the assembly at Stormont.
Such an unrepresentative government controlled the civil service. Public
administration totally lacked Catholic managers at its upper levels in
Northern Ireland for the half-century after partition. Even middle levels of
administration had very few Catholic employees. Catholics generally had
access to only the lowest level of public sector jobs, and even there in less
82
than their proportional numbers in the population.
77 Id. at 10-13.
7
8 Id. at 4-5.
79 Id. at 8; TowNsHEND, supra note 38, at 118-19; HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 154.
80
McKrrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 9.
81 Id. at 8; TOWNSHEND, supra note 38, at 190-91.
82 TOWNSHEND, supra note 38, at 192-96.
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Social organizations, particularly the Orange Order, further tightened the
Protestant stranglehold on civil and economic life. These purely Protestant,
fraternal groups cemented relationships between members of the elite in the
North from the 1920s onward. 83 They provided leadership for government,
civil service, and. private enterprise while celebrating the triumph of
Protestant rule in-the British Isles. These organizations run the parades that
create such tension in Northern Ireland each summer during the so-called
"marching season." These parades celebrate Protestant victories over
Catholics that occurred hundreds of years ago. It was often in the halls of the
Orange Order that political decisions were made and economic and social
policies were decided upon for governance of the Northern Irish state. The
leadership of the Orange Order, overlapping significantly with the leadership
of government in the Stormont system, was able to ladle out patronage in the
form of jobs, housing, and other economic benefits to its constituency while
84
leaving the nationalist constituency in the cold.

VII. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: NATIONALIST AND REPUBLICAN

When broadly used, "nationalist" can mean the entire community of
Ireland, North and South, which supports a single united state for that island.
Irish nationalism of this sort probably first arose in its modern form in the
nineteenth century. In the North today, nationalists, again in a broad sense,
refers to the entire community which seeks unity with the South-that is, a
single state that identifies itself as an Irish state. In a slightly narrower sense,
nationalist is sometimes used to describe the Catholic community in
Northern Ireland. Some prefer this term to the word "Catholic" because they
argue that the basic conflict in Ireland is not one of religion, but one of
political belief and power. While it is probably true that there may be a small
percentage of Protestant nationalists in the North and perhaps a few Catholic
unionists who prefer to remain part of the United Kingdom, generally
speaking, the use of the term "nationalist community" in Northern Ireland
can generally be taken to refer to the Catholic community. Sometimes the
word nationalist is used in an even narrower sense. I have heard republicans
say they are not nationalists. Here, they are distinguishing themselves from
constitutional nationalists who believe in the gradual process of reunifying
Ireland through peaceful legislative means. Under the broader definition,
83 See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 82; O'BRIEN & O'BRIEN, supra note 13, at 92-97;
THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF IRELAND 181-83 (R.F. Foster ed., 1989). See

generally Coakley, ConstitutionalInnovation, supra note 29, at 1, 13; McKrrRICK &
MCVEA, supra note 4, at 13-17; White, supra note 21, at 178.
84 McKrrrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 13-17.
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republicans would be considered part of the nationalist community.
Until the Easter Rebellion of 1916, probably the bulk of nationalists
probably assumed that Irish nationhood would be realized within the context
of the British Empire, in the form of home rule. 85 Only a small section of
nationalists envisioned a complete break from the Crown. Such
"republicans" were given a large political boost by the national reaction to
the brutal way the British suppressed the 1916 uprising.8 6 From that point on,
republicanism represented a major strand within nationalism under which
armed struggle was viewed as a legitimate means of attaining Irish
independence and unity. Ironically, once the southern counties of Ireland
became independent and eventually a republic, republicanism started to mean
less to the population there. In fact, the leadership of the Republic of Ireland
has so disapproved of the radical republicanism of the IRA that for most of
its existence, that organization has been illegal in the South as well as in the
87
North.
VIII. DIALOGUE 1
Sean:

88
The people of Ireland deserve self-determination. It is their right.

John:

There is no "people" of Ireland. There are two communities here,
and the majority community in the North has its own right to selfdetermination. We're British and we want to be part of the United
Kingdom. We have that right.

Sean:

But it's one island. The Irish nation is a natural unit. It occupies the
entire island.

John:

Then I suppose you also would say that neither the Welsh nor the

85 The home rule movement occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 113-14; see generally O'DAY, supra note 49.
86
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STRUGGLE FOR IRISH FREEDOM 1912-1922, at 79-104 (1996); O'DAY, supra note 49, at

268-69.
87 Heidi L. Wushinske, Note & Comment, Politicians and Paramilitaries:Is
Decommissioning a Requirement of the Belfast Agreement?, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 613,625 (2003).

88 Sean is a republican, John a unionist, Liam a nationalist, Lou a loyalist, Frank a
Belgian Europeanist, Joseph a historian, Mary a Catholic mom, and Betty a Protestant
mom.
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Scots have any right to rule themselves. The English are the
dominant ethnic group on that island-the island of Britain. They
should rule it all under your logic.
Sean:

But they do and they have.

John:

But do you agree that they should?

Sean:

The difference is that Britain conquered Ireland and it has continued
to hold on to a third of that conquest illegitimately.

John:

So it is not a matter of territorial unity. It's a matter of who
committed an historical wrong 400 years ago.

Sean:

It's both of those things. This was an Irish island and Britain took it
away. Now it has failed to give back a major part of it.

John:

The majority living in Northern Ireland has lived here for centuries.
They have worked the land. They have manned the factories. Are we
supposed to disappear? I suppose you think that 300 million
Americans should give back their country to the Indians from whom
they stole? And for that matter, the Canadians, the Brazilians, the
Australians, and Argentineans as well? You can't unscramble an
omelet.

Sean:

We'll ignore the fact that an omelet is not scrambled. In any event, it
is not the right metaphor. Regardless of the situation that Australians,
Canadians, Americans, and New Zealanders find themselves in, the
wrong done to Ireland can be undone. While a few hundred thousand
Indians perhaps can't expect to reclaim America, for Ireland it is
simply a matter of reunifying with the Republic that already exists.

John:

And what about the self-determination rights of the majority that live
in Ulster?

Sean:

For one thing, you don't have a majority in "Ulster." Ulster was nine
counties of old Ireland. The British carved away three of those nine
just to gerrymander the rest into a Protestant enclave. But in any
case, when the island is reunited your minority will be protected by
rights under the European Convention and rights under the Irish
Constitution. That is more protection than the Brits ever accorded us
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and certainly more than you accorded us under the Stormont System.
John:

Why should we trust your supposed rights? Can we believe bombthrowers, house-burners, murderers, terrorists?

Sean:

Violence during the troubled years was self-defense on the part of
Republicans fighting against an occupation army. It was a war of
liberation.

John:

It was not! But even in a war, there are rules. The laws of war outlaw
the slaughter of innocent civilians. The IRA trampled on all
humanitarian principles when it ignored those rules.

Sean:

Catholic babies, women, and old folks were slaughtered too. Loyalist
militias were just as vicious in their violence-more vicious than the
IRA. Loyalist thugs more regularly targeted noncombatants. Under a
united Ireland, however, we will be more humane rulers than you
ever were.

John:

How can we believe that? Even under the Belfast Agreement of
1998, where great risks were taken by our community in an attempt
to reach a solution, you have failed to disarm. You have failed to
meet your promises of decommissioning.

Sean:

There you go again with your red herring of decommissioning.
We've now reached your excuse for not carrying out your
obligations under the Good Friday Agreement. You never wanted
true peace. You have always wanted to continue your domination.
This fuss about decommissioning is your ploy to kill the powersharing government that was set up. 89 The government that finally
gave us a voice in our own land.

John:

(turning to the others) Do you see why we cannot trust these people?
For thirty years they shoot and maim innocent children and then,
after compromise and risk-taking by the Unionist community, they
won't recognize our legitimate fears that their weapons pose a threat
to us.

89
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Frank: But hasn't there been decommissioning? Hasn't General de
Chastelain certified that the IRA has been putting its arms beyond
use?
John:

Even Tony Blair from a pro-Irish Labor Party no longer believes
that. As he said a few months ago, the time for ambiguity is over.
Sinn Fein loves to use ambiguity-promising one thing, taking what
it wants, and then letting that promise disappear. These people don't
understand the concept of a solemn contract.

Sean:

Solemn contracts are a tool of the powerful to force the weak into
bad bargains. Republicans will never again let the unionists or
British make us weak.

John:

How do you expect us to trust you if you don't honor your
agreements?

Liam:

Our party has always spoken out against violence. But I must agree
with my republican friend here. All nationalists, including myself,
realize that trust isn't built from the words of a contract. Perhaps the
problem is that you English produce great lawyers while we Irish
produce great poets. Trust is developed from the totality of living
and working together. The Good Friday Agreement sets some basis
for that. You have used decommissioning as a pretext to scuttle that
Agreement. But the importance of the Agreement was not in its
contractual nature. The importance of the Agreement is in the new
order that it set up; an order for cooperation between communities in
the six counties and an order for cooperation between the
governments in Belfast and Dublin, and between this island and the
island of Britain. It is only by allowing such relationships to develop
and work that trust will be born.

Sean:

When we talk about trust, what about 400 years of colonization,
domination, and genocide? You have read about the Potato
Famine. 90 You know of the summary executions during Easter

90
See Christaldi, supra note 54, at 140. A potato blight followed by eviction,
famine, and emigration struck Ireland in the late 1840s. Irish nationalists often claim that
the British bear much blame for the suffering and death involved because of agricultural,
trade, and land policies which exacerbated the plight of Irish peasants after disease
devastated their basic source of food and income.
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1916. 9 1
Joseph: Do you intend to use history as a trump card in all moral debates?
Can there ever be reconciliation in long-term conflicts, particularly
where opposing groups share territory, if the group with better claim
to historical injustice can ease its current burden to negotiate, and to
92
act in good faith based on the historical wrongs done against it?
IX. GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT (DECOMMISSIONING EXCERPT)

All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total
disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their
intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the
Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to
achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years
following endorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement
and in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement. 93
X. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: DECOMMISSIONING

As part of the peace process, all sides agreed that paramilitaries would
give up their arms. The word for this has been "decommissioning." Using
that word seems to be something of a nod to the IRA's take on the conflictit was a conflict between militaries and hence a giving up of arms would be
the decommissioning of an army. The actual process of decommissioning is
probably the single greatest roadblock to further progress in the peace
process. The IRA has been particularly slow in giving up its arms. In fact, its
view of decommissioning is that its obligation, if any, is to put its armaments
"beyond use."' 94 This throws another ambiguous phrase into the pot. It seems
that the question of what constitutes beyond use and whether it really implies
91 See TOWNSHEND, supra note 38, at 76-81.
92 A "transitional justice" literature has emerged in recent years which, among other
things, deals with the complexities of past wrongs and their weight in future
reconciliation. See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
93 THE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 20.
94 DIXON, supra note 25, at 269-74; Stefan Wolff, Introduction: From Sunningdale
to Belfast, 1973-98, in PEACE AT LAST? THE IMPACT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT

ON NORTHERN IRELAND 1, 13 (Jrg Neuheiser & Stefan Wolff eds., 2003); Stephen Farry,
The Morning After: An Alliance Perspective on the Agreement, in PEACE AT LAST? THE
IMPACT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND, supra, at 25, 36-39;

Keenan, supra note 25; Sharrock & Jones, supra note 25.
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the destruction or giving up of arms is open to much debate. The relationship
between Sinn Fein, which is a party to the GFA, and its paramilitary
counterpart, the IRA, casts further ambiguity into the situation. Sinn Fein
somewhat acknowledges the link, but disclaims any power to dictate
95
disarmament to the IRA.
XI. HISTORY 3

The British government, for decades following the 1921 partition,
maintained a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Northern
Ireland. 96 This final factor in the Stormont formula assured that Protestant
domination and discrimination against the Catholic community would not be
challenged successfully. London subsidized the North with significant
economic aid, but gave it a free hand in managing its political, economic, and
social policies. Thus, for the half-century between the partition and the rise
unionists were
of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, Protestant
97
able to totally dominate society behind a democratic faqade.
From the 1920s through the 1950s, those forces that might have been
expected to support greater equity for the nationalist community in the North
were either absent or ineffetive. First, the government in the South, while
sympathetic to the northern Catholic community, was too busy struggling to
get its own house into viable political and economic order. Parliamentary
leaders of the Catholic community in the North were completely excluded
from the halls of power for the reasons discussed above regarding the
Stormont system. Militant republicans in the North, in the form of a
periodically reincarnated IRA, lacked both internal and external support and
were easily repressed by the Stormont establishment. Finally, potential
external allies, such as Liberals and Laborites in Britain, were distracted
during these decades by events in Europe leading up to, during, and after the
98
Second World War.
The 1960s began to bring change. Catholics in the North noticed that
they were not sharing in the prosperity of postwar recovery that characterized
Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. 99 The civil rights movement for African95 Gerry Moriarty, SF is Willing to Find Accommodation on Arms, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1999 at 7, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File.
96 DIXON, supra note 25, at 49.
97 See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 178-81; MCKITTRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at
21-29.
98 See MCKITrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 21-29.
99 See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 179-80; THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
IRELAND, supra note 83, at 269-70.
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Americans in the United States received worldwide attention and no doubt
influenced Northern Irish Catholics who viewed themselves as excluded
from society's benefits as black Americans. Furthermore, liberals and
democratic socialists in Great Britain itself were finally prepared to support
the cause of equality in one of their own provinces. Leaders like Bernadette
Devlin, John Hume, and Gerry Fitt led peaceful protest marches in
Londonderry, Belfast, and elsewhere, demanding fairer voting procedures
(particularly one-person, one-vote), anti-discrimination laws, fairer housing,
the repeal of special powers (that allowed, among other things, internment
without trial), and the disbanding of the B Specials (a group of paramilitary
police who had been especially harsh in its treatment of the Catholic
community during times of tension). 100
In the 1960s, the Irish civil rights movement pursued its aims in a
nonviolent manner, patterning itself after the American civil rights
movement earlier in the decade.' 0 ' The Stormont government responded to a
number of nonviolent demonstrations with significant force. Photos of
bleeding heads and faces of demonstrators went out across the global news
wires and reached periodicals and television screens. Substantial sympathy
developed in Britain and the United States, where it was widely believed that
the demonstrators were, after all, only demanding a fair share in what was
supposed to be a democratic state. 10 2 At this point, reunification with the
South was not one of the demands of the movement. The Unionist
government in the North badly miscalculated and overreacted to the civil
rights movement. It miscalculated the degree to which the British
government would tolerate such repression and also the effect that its
intransigent insistence on holding onto its unequal prerogatives would have
on the Catholic community.
By the early 1970s, the nationalist community in the North was heavily
repoliticized. A new Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), headed by
Fitt and Hume, represented the constitutionalist reaction to the repression.
The party gained widespread support in the nationalist community. 10 3 The
repression of the civil rights movement in the North also catalyzed more
radical republicanism. The IRA, long dormant and marginalized, became a
significant factor again. 10 4 In one of its many rebirths and reformulations, the
Provisional IRA (and its Sinn Fein political counterpart) emerged from a
100 McKrrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 36-40.
101 Id. at 40.
102 See O'BRIEN & O'BRIEN, supra note 13, at 169-72.

103 See McKrrrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 64.
104 Id. at 60-61.
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doctrinal split in 1971 with the "Official IRA." The latter had become more
and more Marxist through the 1960s, but perhaps, ironically, less
confrontational. The Provisional IRA was not interested in leftist ideology
but in republican militancy. The Provisional IRA or "Provos" became
increasingly dominant, and as violence broke out in the North in the 1970s,
became the main armed wing of Catholic paramilitarism.10 5 (The present-day
10 6
IRA and Sinn Fein descended from this Provisional wing.)
British troops were sent to Northern Ireland in 1969 to quell growing
disturbances and violence between the nationalist civil rights movement and
loyalist gangs, apparently supported by police and paramilitary police units
such as the "B Specials." These troops were welcomed in the Catholic
community. Nationalists initially viewed them as protectors against loyalist
and government violence. 10 7 They were sent by a left-leaning labor
government in London whose Home Secretary, James Callahan, was cheered
when he first appeared in the Bogside Catholic neighborhood of Derry in
1969.108 However, the situation for British soldiers deteriorated in the first
couple years of their assignment in the North. 1°9 Loyalist and republican
violence began breaking out on a regular basis. Targeting by both loyalists
and republicans in their violent attacks was rather inaccurate and random
with innocent civilians being killed on both sides. When the IRA began
targeting the British army, the die was cast. British soldiers died at the hands
of the IRA, and Catholics died at the hands of British soldiers. A few such
incidents reversed the initial nationalist sympathy for the army. "Bloody
Sunday" stands out as the most notorious of these incidents. British troops
fired on a crowd of Catholic civil rights demonstrators in Derry on Sunday,
January 30, 1972, killing 13 people and wounding 14.110 While British
military spokesmen initially claimed that the troops were fired upon,
subsequent investigation seems to indicate that the British Army fired its
weapons without equivalent armed provocation from the nationalist side."'
105 See id.
106 ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNICA

ONLINE,

Sinn

Fein

(2004),

at

http://search.eb.com/eb/print?eu=69705 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
107 See MCKrrrRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 55-56.
108 DIXON, supra note 25, at 105-12.
109
MCKITTRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 61-65.
110/d. at 76; DON MULLAN, BLOODY SUNDAY: MASSACRE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
11, 14 (1997).
111 See MULLAN, supra note 110, at 11-12; McKITTRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at
76-77; Jimmy Bums, Army Chief Faces Renewed Bloody Sunday Allegations, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Oct. 7, 2003, at 6, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Fintime File; Jim Dee,
Inquiry Opens in N. Ireland Into 1972 'Bloody Sunday' Massacre, BOSTON HERALD,
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Two decades of violence, with an alphabet soup of paramilitaries on both
sides (the UDA, the UFF, the UPV, the UVF, the official IRA, the
Provisional IRA, the real IRA, the INLA, and the continuity IRA), marked
what became known as "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland. 112 At the
beginning of this quarter-century of violence, there was a glimmer of hope
that constitutional reform could avoid violent deterioration. The Sunningdale
Agreement was a power-sharing compromise promoted by Great Britain and
moderate forces from both communities in Northern Ireland, from which true
reform would come to the government in Northern Ireland. 113 Reforms in
voting, discrimination law, housing, and policing were scheduled to take
place in the early 1970s through the new Sunningdale system. 114 However,
just as this new power-sharing government was to go into effect in 1972,
loyalists from the Protestant community successfully organized a general
strike which shut down the economy in the North and forced the British to
cancel the new governing arrangement and institute direct rule from London
over Northern Ireland.' 1 5 While neither side was happy with direct rule, it
was probably most offensive to the nationalist community, who had regarded
Sunningdale as a way to at least begin the end of discrimination. More
people died from politically-related violence in Northern Ireland in 1972 than
6
in any other year of the Troubles, with almost 500 deaths among all sides."1
A cycle of radicalization, overreaction, and violence continued over twenty
years after the failure of Sunningdale. One might speculate why the greatest
Mar. 28, 2000, at 7, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bherld File.
112 See generally CAIN Web Service, Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland
(1968 to the Present), at http://cain.ulst.ac.ukl (last visited Oct. 25, 2004); Explanation
Guide, The Troubles: Meaning,
at http://explanation-guide.info/meaning/TheTroubles.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2004); Travel Through the Ireland Story, The
Troubles, at http://www.irelandstory.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
113 See Wolff, supra note 94, at 7-8, 20; Gerard Murray, The Good Friday
Agreement: An SDLP Analysis of the Northern Ireland Conflict, in PEACE AT LAST? THE
IMPACT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 94, at 45,

48; TOWNSHEND, supra note 38, at 210-13.
114 MULLAN, supra note 110, at 11-30.
115 Whether the strike enjoyed broad support among all Protestants or primarily
succeeded because of loyalist intimidation of its own community is debatable. See
generally THOMAS HENNESSEY, THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS ENDING THE

TROUBLES? 10-18 (2001); Donald L. Horowitz, The Northern Ireland Agreement: Clear
Consociational, and Risky, in NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED WORLD: THE
NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AND THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT IN COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE 89,96, 98 (John McGarry ed., 2001); McKrTrRiCK & MCVEA, supra note 4,
at 107-17.
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number of deaths occurred in the early years of the Troubles-outrage over
internment without trial by government authorities, the failure of
Sunningdale, the presence on the streets of hard-core paramilitarists who
were gradually imprisoned in greater numbers, or a diminishing taste on the
part of the general public for unwarranted violence-perhaps all of these
helped to explain the downward trend in death as the Troubles dragged on.
The 1980s brought some changes both in tactics and in background
reality. Republicans in prison used the hunger strike as a weapon to gain
sympathy for their cause, both within their own nationalist community and in
the wider world, with strong success in the former and mixed results in the
latter. 1 7 Republican militants outside the walls of the prisons began bombing
targets on the British mainland, particularly those representing political
authority and economic power. 118 The British government itself -evolved in
its attitude toward Northern Ireland and began to accept the possibility that it
not remain part of the United Kingdom forever. 1 19 By the 1980s, the British
government seemed to accept the notion that the majority of the population
in Northern Ireland had a right to determine its future, and that future could
include reunification with the South if democratically chosen. Enmity
continued to fade between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom,
as both states seemed to agree that near-term peace was essential and that
long-term political status was negotiable. 120 By the end of the decade, the
demise of the Cold War, apartheid in South Africa, and Latin American
dictatorships seemed to increase a global, psychological momentum toward
settling previously intractable disputes, such as the one in Northern Ireland.
Prosperity-in the South militated in the same direction, tempting many
12
northerners with the prospect of a peace dividend. 1
The 1970s and 1980s were decades of the Troubles in Northern Ireland;
nonetheless, the seeds of settlement were being quietly sown. Although
bombings, internments, communal strife, hunger strikes, and the like
garnered most of the publicity, foundations for peace were being laid both
internally and externally. Concurrent with the start of the Troubles in the
22
early 1970s, Britain and Ireland both joined the European Community.'
117 Id. at 141-48.
118 Id. at 149-50.
119 Brian D. Vaughan, Will God Save the Queen? Shared Authority and Sovereignty
in Northern Ireland and the Case for Cross-BorderBodies, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 511, 515
(2000).
120 Id.

121 James J. Friedberg, Field Notes (1998, 2000) (on file with author).
12 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 166 (Desmond Dinan ed., 2000)
[hereinafter EUROPEAN UNION].
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While such accessions had no visible immediate impact in lessening the
discord and violence in Northern Ireland, they nonetheless set the stage for a
cosmic change in attitude regarding nationalism, statehood, and the problems
of partition. Ireland, which had stayed out of World War RI and western
coalitions against the Soviets (most notably NATO), was now part of a large,
growing transnational organization that included its historical enemy, Britain.
Changes on the ground often lead to changes in mentality. Furthermore, the
type of organization that Ireland joined together turned out to be highly
significant. The European Community (now the European Union), as
mentioned in other parts of this work, constituted a new kind of international
order' 23-- one in which state sovereignty became divisible. State members of
the European Community gave up significant parts of their lawmaking and
executing power to Community administration in Brussels. Presumably,
neither British nor Irish leaders were thinking of the Northern Irish crisis at
the time of accession into the Community; however, the significance of such
accession must be regarded as a turning away from the exclusivist notion of a
sovereign state. It is not much of a jump to argue that if Britain or Ireland
could share sovereignty within a larger Europe, they could also share
sovereignty in some way within Northern Ireland.
The accession to the European Community also had profound
significance within the Irish Republic. After centuries of looking toward
other continental powers as a counterweight to British domination (the
Spanish, the French, and even the Germans), after centuries of failing in such
attempts at shaking the British domination, the European Community offered
a new and better solution. Whereas Irish nationalists had unsuccessfully
sought liberation through military alliance with Spanish and French
governments, economic alliance with Europe presented a more profound,
lasting (and to Britain, less threatening) solution to the dilemma of
dependence. Prior to membership in the Community, even though the
Republic was politically independent, its economy was still tremendously
dependent on its British neighbor to the east. 124 Culturally, Ireland had never
fully emerged from the shadow of the former colonial power. However, by
joining with Europe in the 1970s, Ireland had access to both economic and
cultural independence through increased trade and the economic aid that
flowed from the Community to poorer regions. 125 Ireland gradually increased
both its economic product and its self-esteem. By the end of the two decades
123 ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNICA

ONLINE,

European

Union,

http://search.eb.com/eb/print?eu=33850 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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124 THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF IRELAND, supra note 83, at 259-60.

125 See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 189-98.

at

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 20:1 2005]

of the Troubles in the early 1990s, the Republic of Ireland had a per capita
income roughly equal to that of the United Kingdom.' 26 While Northern
Ireland had stagnated because of civil strife and the decline of the rust belt
industries, the Republic had prospered under the new order created by its
relationship with Europe. 127 New prosperity led to a new mentality. No
longer chafing under a British yoke, the Irish in the South could be more
conciliatory in terms of settling age-old disputes with their neighbor.
Within Northern Ireland itself, even during the Troubles, some seeds of
harmony began to be planted. In the 1970s, after numerous deaths in both
Protestant and Catholic communities, a new peace movement started
predominately by women gained prominence. Peace marches led by women
from both communities were held to protest bombings and violence coming
from republicans, loyalists, and the British military, and to demand that all
parties cease their assaults on each other and on the civilian population. The
women's marches got worldwide attention and two of the organizers
received the Nobel Peace Prize.128 While the movement lost momentum in
the 1980s, the seeds of intercommunal cooperation had been sowed.
Although violence continued, so did a growing opposition to it.
By the early 1990s, the pressure of public opinion, the desires of the Irish
and British governments, as well as outside pressure from American and
European governments, set the stage for parties in Northern Ireland to move
toward ending the violence. Cease fires declared by the IRA and loyalist
groups were usually observed, but sometimes violated. 12 9 Eventually,
however, all major parties reached the peace table and negotiated the Good
Friday Agreement.

126/d. at 193.

127 Michael Busby, Luck of the Irish: Ireland Has Become the Technological
Wonderland of the European Union, 11 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J., Summer 2002, at

55, 56-59 (2002); Steve James, Ireland: Social Tensions Deepen as the "Celtic Tiger"
Staggers, World Socialist Web Site, at http:lwww.wsws.orglarticlesl2002/nov2OO2/iren07.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
128 The
Nobel
Peace
Prize
1976,
Nobelprize.org,
at
http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1976/index.html (last modified June 16, 2000) (last
visited Oct. 25, 2004) (recognizing Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan as recipients of
one half of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1976; both were founders of the Northern Ireleand
Peace Movemant, which was later renamed the Community of Peace People).
129 Kieran McEvoy, Prisoners, The Agreement, and the Political Characterof the
Northern IrelandConflict, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1539, 1550-52 (1999).
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XII. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT (DECLARATION OF SUPPORT
EXCERPT)
1. We, the participants in the multi-party negotiations, believe that the
agreement we have negotiated offers a truly historic opportunity for a
new beginning.
2. The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable
legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been
injured, and their families. But we can best honour them though a fresh
start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of
reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and
vindication of the human rights of all.
3. We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis
of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and
between these islands.
4. We affirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic
and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our
opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political
purpose, whether in regard to this agreement or otherwise.
5. We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and
equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavour to
strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement
within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements. We
pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and
every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement. It
is accepted that all of the institutional and constitutional arrangementsan Assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council,
implementation bodies, a British-Irish Council and a British-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference and any amendments to British Acts of
Parliament and the Constitution of Ireland-are interlocking and
interdependent and that in particular the functioning of the Assembly
and the North/South Council are so closely inter-related that the success
of each depends on that of the other.
6. Accordingly, in a spirit of concord, we strongly commend this agreement
130
to the people, North and South, for their approval.

XIII. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT (CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
EXCERPT)
1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish
Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the
Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will:
130 THE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 1.

145

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

(i)

[Vol. 20:1 20051

recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by
a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its
status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with
Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;
(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by
agreement between the two parts respectively and without external
impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the
basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South,
to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that
this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the
agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland;
(iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in
Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the
people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish
of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised
and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and, accordingly, that
Northern Ireland's status as part of the United Kingdom reflects
and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any
change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a
majority of its people;
(iv) affirm that if, in the future, the people of the island of Ireland
exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in
sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be
a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support
in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that
wish;
(v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the
people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government
with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality
on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and
traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for,
and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of
freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of
esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos, and
aspirations of both communities;
(vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to
identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as
they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to
hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both
Governments and would not be affected by any future change in
the status of Northern Ireland.
2. The participants also note that the two Governments have accordingly
undertaken in the context of this comprehensive political agreement, to
propose and support changes in, respectively, the Constitution of Ireland
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and in British legislation relating to the constitutional status of Northern
13 1
Ireland.
XIV. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: UNIONIST AND LOYALIST

Like "nationalist," "unionist" has both a broad and a narrow meaning.
"Loyalists," a radical subgroup within unionism, occupy a contrasting
posture to their more moderate counterparts, just as republicans contrast
themselves to moderate nationalists. When discussing the two predominant
groups in conflict in Northern Ireland, "unionist" is used to refer to the
Protestant community in the same way "nationalist" is used to describe the
Catholic community. The term is somewhat preferred by those who feel that
the conflict is not best set in religious terms but in political ones. A unionist
favors the continued union with Great Britain within the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In its narrow sense, a unionist may be
looked at in contrast to a loyalist, the other major segment of Northern Irish
Protestant political opinion.
The ideological difference between loyalists and unionists is not as easily
defined as that between republicans and constitutional nationalists. The
loyalists are clearly more extreme and, like the Republicans, are willing to
resort to violence. The defining characteristic of loyalism might be viewed as
more visceral and less civic than unionism, namely loyalty to the monarchy
and the crown, as opposed to the British political system. It should be noted
that in the Fall elections of 2003, when the middle segment of the population
lost ground in both communities to the extremes, it was a republican and a
loyalist party, Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
respectively, that gained ground against their constitutional nationalist and
unionist counterparts, the SDLP and the UUP. 132 Note the further ambiguity;
the name of the loyalist DUP Party includes the word "unionist,"
demonstrating again there is no firm and consistent logic to the ambiguous
vocabulary that one must use to discuss the Northern Ireland conflict.

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Rosie Cowan, Hardliners Gain in Ulster Poll, GUARDIAN, Nov. 28, 2003, at 2,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Guardn File; David McKittrick, Ballots Replace
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XV. ARTICLES

2

AND

3 OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF IRELAND

Pre-Good Friday Agreement
Article 2
The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its
islands and the territorial seas.
Article 3
Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without
prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established
by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that
territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area
and extent of application as the laws of Saorstqt Eireann and the like
133
extra-territorial effect.
34

Post-Good Friday Agreement'
Article 2
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island
of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish
nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified
in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the
Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry
living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.
Article 3
1. It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to
unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland,
in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising
that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful
means with the consent of a majority of the people,
democratically expressed, in both jurisdictionsin the island. Until
then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by this
133 CONST. OF IRELAND, art. 2 & 3

(1937),

at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Articles_2_and_3_of theConstitutionofIreland (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); CONST. OF
IRELAND, available at http://www.maths.tcd.ie/pub/Constitution/Preamble.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004).
134 Amendment 19 of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland replaced Articles 2 and 3
with new language, as mandated by Annex B to the "Constitution Issues" section of the
GFA. See CONST. OF IRELAND, pt. H (Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act,
1998), available at http://www.gov.ie/bills28/acts/1998/a98-19am.pdf (last visited Oct.
25,2004).

148

AMBIGUITY, SOVEREIGNTY, IDENTITY

Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as
the laws enacted by the Parliament that existed immediately
before the coming into operation of this Constitution.
2. Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared
between those jurisdictions may be established by their respective
responsible authorities for stated purposes and may exercise
1 35
powers and functions in respect of all or any part of the island.
XVI. CONSTITUTIONS AND TRANSITION
Constitutional ambiguity weaves its way through both the problems of
Northern Ireland and the potential solution. Rules found in constitutions or
in constitution-like sources have sometimes impeded and sometimes
facilitated the peace process. Elites tend to create and administer
constitutions. Communities may need to oppose this tendency to allow for
the benefits of an integrated dispute settlement.
In a rather unique situation, at least four constitutional jurisdictions
intersect in Northern Ireland today-British, Irish, Northern Irish, and
European. The latter can be viewed as two-European Union (EU) and
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This overlap recapitulates
our themes of ambiguity, divisible sovereignty, and Europeanization.
Under nineteenth-century international legal positivist analysis, the
United Kingdom would presently possess exclusive sovereignty over
Northern Ireland. Most international institutions, from the U.N. down,
operate under this assumption of undivided sovereignty-within their halls,
the U.K. exclusively represents the people of Northern Ireland. 136 So,
Northern Ireland shares whatever constitution governs the U.K. The
ambiguity begins here, for the British Constitution does not exist on a single
document. 137 Jurists have often described it as "unwritten," but that is an
oversimplification. While the overriding principle of parliamentary
supremacy is sort of unwritten, the statutes enacted by Westminster pursuant
to such supremacy are textual, and the most important of them function as
basic law. (Furthermore, written texts such as the 1689 Bill of Rights,
underlie the supremacy principle.) More accurately, we can say no single
135 Id. (emphasis added). Had the amendment stated "each jurisdiction," the
commitment to unification by consent only would have been less ambiguous.
136 List of Member States, United Nations, at http://www.un.org/Overviewl
unmember.htmI (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
137 Michael Burgess, Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom: New Model or
Mere Respray?, 40 S. TEX. L. REv. 715,717 (1999).

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 20:1 2005]

document contains the British Constitution and any ordinary parliamentary
act can amend it-two qualities making Britain unique among industrial
democracies.' 38 Over the centuries, Parliament has enacted basic laws for the
political structure and governance of Ireland or Northern Ireland, most
recently pursuant to the GFA. One could claim with some force that such
legislation was U.K.-based constitutional law.
Northern Ireland itself offers the second source of constitutional
jurisdiction. Ambiguities operate here as well. If Westminster legislation
forms its constitution, then the territory could be seen as merely a constituent
unit of the British state, just as Ohio, California, or West Virginia are
constituent units of the United States. Unlike U.S. states, however, neither
the people of the territory nor their own legislature have produced such a
local constitution.1 39 The London parliament has provided the basic laws,
and legislation from Stormont, when it met, was subsidiary. 140 An attempt at
a cross-community negotiated constitution for the North failed in the late
1980s. 14 1 Until the GFA in 1998, no constitutional structure existed at the
Ulster level that challenged the reality of absolute sovereignty.
Of course, the Republic of Ireland also accepted the political notion of
absolute sovereignty, but disputed the legitimate holder in the North. Prior to
the GFA, the Irish Constitution asserted sovereignty over the whole island,
thus presenting a second exclusivist vision to constitutional jurisdiction in the
North, incompatible with the British and unionist vision.142 The GFA offered
138 See Kieran McEvoy & John Morison, Constitutional and Institutional
Dimension: Beyond the "ConstitutionalMoment": Law, Transition,and Peacemaking in
Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 961, 963-64 (2003); Sir Peter North, The
United Kingdom-An Era of Constitutional Change, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 99, 101-02 (2000); Vincent P. Pace, Note & Comment, Partial
Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights: The Canadian Model Offers a Viable Solution to the
United Kingdom's Bill of Rights Debate, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 151 (1998).
139 The 1921 Government of Ireland Act describes parts thereof as "Constitutional
Northern Ireland." It, of course, is a statute from the British Parliament at Westminster.
McKiTRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 4.

140 MCKrrTRICK & MCVEA, supra note 4, at 21-25.
141 Feargal Cochrane, Unsung Heroes? The Role of Peace and Conflict Resolution
Organizationsin the Northern Ireland Conflict, in NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED
WORLD: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AND THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 115, at 137, 138-146; Martin Mansberg, The

Early Stages of the Irish Peace Process, at http://www.c-r.org/accord/ireland/accord8/
early.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
142 See CONST. OF IRELAND, art. 2 (1937) (prior to 1998 Amendment), which reads,
"Article 2 [Territory] The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its
islands[,] and the territorial seas."
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a vision of peace based on shared sovereignty (in fact, if not in word). The
Irish state and constitution had their own ambiguous evolutions. A
Westminster parliamentary act created the Irish Free State as a British
Empire dominion in 1921 (from the 26 counties of southern Ireland). 14 3 That
state adopted its own written constitution in 1937, neither mentioning nor
disclaiming Ireland's connection to the Empire and the Crown. 144 However,
in 1949, the Dublin government declared the state a republic, breaking ties
with the Crown. 145 Over three decades, the state centered in Dublin evolved
from a product of British law and partition to a sovereign state whose
constitution set up a legal claim to sovereignty incompatible with British
sovereignty.
Europe appears as the fourth contestant for constitutional sovereignty in
Northern Ireland. Unlike Britain and the Irish Republic, however, Europe's
claim is neither exclusive nor explicitly articulated. Rather, it is functional
and implicit-implicit in the reality of shared sovereignty that has evolved
over the last half century through the law and practice of the EU, and to a
narrower degree, the European Human Rights system. Each of these
European entities possess a constitution-like document (the Treaty of Rome
and the ECHR, respectively) that have gradually and ambiguously come to
occupy domains of sovereignty at the expense of exclusivist statism. 146 Such
occupancy helped prepare the ground for the GFA.
While both the Treaty of Rome and the ECHR operate at the
international level to create state-to-state rights and obligations for the U.K.
and Ireland, as well as for other state parties, unlike traditional treaties, they
have also created rights and obligations for individuals. 14 7 European court
rulings, whether from Strasbourg (ECHR) or Luxembourg (EU), supercede
British and Irish law. 14 8 In this regard, we must at least consider whether
they operate at the constitutional level. The ECHR has handed down
numerous binding legal judgments arising from the Troubles in Northern
143 Elizabeth Kondonijakos, The Reasonable Suspicion Test of Northern Ireland's
Emergency Legislation: A Violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, 3
BuFF. J. INT'L L. 99, 102 (1996).
144 HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 152.
145 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 41, at 1015.
146 See Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms,
as Amended by Protocol No. 11, Council of Europe, available at http://conventions.coe.
int/treaty/en/Treaties/Word/005.doc (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); European Treaties,
Europa, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/treatiesen.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
147 North, supra note 138, at 112-13.
148 See id. at 112-14; Pace, supra note 138, at 158.
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Ireland. The judgments have typically addressed charges against Britain of
wrongful detention, penal treatment, and discrimination. 14 9 Under the Rome
treaty, the EU has, at times, bypassed London and Dublin. For example, the
EU has created regional programs on a supranational level, including
designation of the entire island of Ireland as a single region for certain
development purposes.' 50 Furthermore, the EU has been a major factor in the
economic emergence of Ireland. Europe now governs itself in many matters
on a plane above the level of nation-state, a fact not unfelt in the construction
of the GFA.
XVII. DIALOGUE 2
Joseph: Your problem is confusing the "nation" with the "state." You are
stuck in 1648-the Peace of Westphalia-when the princes of
Europe established their independence from Pope and Emperor.
Those princes-the Kings of France, England, and Sweden-ruled
domains with some significant linguistic and ethnic distinctiveness
and relative uniformity. These emerging "nation-states" were to
dominate the world for three centuries. They claimed a "sovereignty"
that their philosophers viewed as somehow "natural." As more and
more large ethnic groupings emerged from disunity or from their
imperial yokes (the Serbs, the Bulgarians, the Italians), particularly
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they each demanded a
sovereign. Of course, the myth of the "ethnic nation" varied in its
reality. Minorities within nation-states suffered because they were
not sufficiently Serb, or Spanish, or Polish. The Irish "nation," as
much so as any, deserved a state of its own. In 1921, it was perhaps
unfair that the nation only received three-quarters of one state, as its
six northeastern counties were partitioned away. Even this was an
ambiguous unfairness, since the majority in those counties preferred
not to be part of an Irish nation-state. But in any event, today it
should not matter. Today the nation-state is an anachronism just as
surely as the Holy Roman Empire was an anachronism by 1648. The
Republic and the six counties are each part of the European Union.
Much of their economic life is not regulated separately from Dublin
149 See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (1981);
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1976).
150 Tim O'Brien, EU to Give EUR 180m to Revitalize Border Areas, IRISH TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2002, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File; Paul Gillespie,
Dynamics of Devolution Raise Conflict for Blair, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at 13,
availableat LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File.
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or Belfast, but from Brussels. The rights of their residents are
protected from Strasbourg through the European Convention for
Human Rights. In both economics and human rights, European law
trumps local law. Students from the North and South study and travel
throughout the continent and share multiple identities with their
European counterparts. They are European as well as Irish, French,
German, or Spanish. Under these circumstances, the Irish nationstate means much less than it would in 1920 or 1820.
Sean:

What narrow-minded elitism. Take a walk around the Falls or the
Bogside and ask the 19-year-olds about their identity. They're not
damn Europeans. They're not university students reading poetry and
sipping cappuccino. They couldn't tell you what goes on in
Strasbourg or Brussels. More than likely, they're unemployed or
working dead-end jobs. But they know they're Irish and their nation
has been beaten down and its land occupied.

Joseph: But the point is that such an attitude will not bring peace. The
"nation-state" perspective would doom the nationalist and unionist
communities here to perpetual, irreconcilable conflict based on
mutually exclusive interpretations of history and entitlement. When
the Good Friday Agreement "recognise[d] the birthright of all the
people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as
Irish or British, or both" 15 1 we finally got it right. And that
conceptual breakthrough was premised on a world view that rejects
the absolute sovereignty of the classical nation-state.
XVIII. SINN FEIN AND THE EU

Sinn Fein's 152 significant discomfort with the European Union represents
one of the more interesting takes on the issue of divisible sovereignty. Its
posture makes it a bedfellow with groups on the opposite side of the political
spectrum, notably Paisleyites and hardline British Conservatives.
Ideologically, Sinn Fein's European plank does fit its historically political
platform, even if constructed of old wood.
From the start of the Irish Civil War in 1920, radical republicans
151 THE AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
152 Here I mean the present incarnation of Sinn Fein, the political wing of what
emerged in the 1970s as the Provisional IRA; each entity is now dominant in its
respective sphere of republicanism-political and military.
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distinguished themselves from other Irish nationalists by their
uncompromising insistence on an Irish nation-state of 32 counties. 153 In fact,
this insistence led to the Irish Civil War, fought not between Catholics and
Protestants, but within the Catholic ranks. Although almost all nationalists
opposed the partition of Ireland as a permanent situation, gradualists among
them (sometimes called "constitutional nationalists") led the 26 southern
counties to autonomy from Britain by negotiating a peace treaty creating the
Irish Free State (a dominion of the British Empire). 154 More radical
nationalists, i.e., republicans, rejected the Treaty and fought their countrymen
155
in the South for two years in a futile effort to reject the treaty and partition.
For a decade, the rejectionists (loosely the IRA and Sinn Fein
republicans) refused to participate in Irish government, North or South. Not
only did they reject the Stormont Assembly in the Unionist North, but also
the nationalist Dail in the Irish Free State. 156 They reasoned that even sitting
in a nationalist legislature at Dublin was treasonous if it governed only 26
counties of a divided island. (Thus the IRA fought against both governments
and was outlawed in both territories.) While some of the rejectionists (under
the leadership of Eamon DeValera and the Fianna Fail Party) came to
participate in and dominate government in the South starting in the early
1930s, more extreme elements, in the various incarnations of the IRA and
Sinn Fein, continued to find parliamentary government treasonous, even in
the republican South.' 57 After decades of fighting for an all-island, Irish
nation-state with full sovereignty in the Irish People, imagine the chagrin of
Sinn Fein that with British resistance to unification forsworn in the Good
Friday Agreement, unification might be possible-not of a fully sovereign
nation-state, but of a territorial unit within an emerging European super state.
Sinn Fein's position document makes all of the appropriate progressive
democratic criticisms of the EU-bureaucratic arrogance, lack of democratic
accountability, and too little parliamentary power. But these are criticisms of
convenience. Were the EU to become an excellently democratic federation
with a strong, elected parliament, separation of powers, a directly elected
President, and a Bill of Rights, the IRA and Sinn Fein would still oppose it
for the same reason their ideological forbearers opposed the Irish Free State;
153 Mitchell McLaughlin, Redefining Republicanism, in CHANGING SHADES, supra
note 29, at 41; Paul Arthur, The Transformation of Republicanism, in, CHANGING
SHADES, supra note 29, at 84, 86 (emphasis added).
154 See HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 131-35.
155 HENNESSEY, supra note 50, at 166.
156 BOYCE, supra note 40, at 328-29; Coakley, Constitutional Innovation, supra
note 29, at 7.
157 TOWNSHEND, supra note 38, at 108-44.
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anything less than undivided sovereignty on an undivided island ruled by an
Irish nationalist majority defeats the almost century-long aim of radical
republicanism. Sinn Fein/IRA does not want to expel the British Army only
to welcome EU directives. They not only oppose perceived oppression-they
oppose shared sovereignty, even if shared democratically. Ultimately, the EU
may threaten the IRA even more than the British Army, because it is harder
to claim the moral high ground against a democratic federation than against a
purported military occupation.

XIX. DIALOGUE 3
Liam:

Europe has provided Northern Ireland with an exit from its Troubles.
The advent of the European Union demonstrates that we don't have
to choose between mutually exclusive identities. They are a bit ahead
of us on this in the Republic. Watch young people, especially those
in Dublin, Galway, and Cork. They share tastes and values with their
counterparts in Paris, Heidelberg, and Seville. They still feel Irish,
but also European. It is beginning to happen in Belfast and Derry as
well. Our conflict has delayed it, but it is happening.
Once we recognize that we can hold plural identities, the avenue to
coexistence between our communities is broader. As the Good
Friday Agreement says, you can be Irish or British or both. In fact,
we will evolve away from the sense of two communities to a
spectrum of identities within an inclusive Irish nation.

Sean:

Irish nation?! You betray the Irish nation with your elitist, idealistic
Europeanism. An Irish state, a republic independent and governing
our whole island, must constitute the essential core of our
nationhood. Only a united republic can realize our right and
aspiration to self-determination as a people. We are not about to
sacrifice our sovereignty, at the point of hard won and bled for
victory, to a new European superstate.

John:

Why do your "people" have the right to self-determination and not
mine? Unionists comprise a clear majority in Ulster and we reject
unification with the republican South. My people choose to be
British and our self-determination is as a part of the United
Kingdom.

Sean:

But your claim is illegitimate on two accounts. First, the natural unit
for determining the people entitled to self-determination in this case
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is the island of Ireland, not the two partitioned pieces of that island
carved up by Britain in 1921. Your "Ulster" is not even the
legitimate province of that name. Three of its Catholic counties were
excluded at partition to assure a Protestant majority.
Second, your Unionist majority in the six counties descends from
dispossession and theft. Your ancestors stole the land from its
rightful Irish inhabitants under the swords of Cromwell and William
of Orange. Your "Billy" wasn't even a Brit-he was a bloody
Dutchman. No moral claim to self-determination can be based on
such a history.
John:

You have no right to the moral high ground based on events from
300 and 400 years ago. Events, by the way, that are open to differing
interpretations. Your deposed King James was no saint. Western
civilization progressed with his defeat. In any event, such ancient
history shouldn't matter. The majority in Ulster has legitimated its
claim to self-determination through centuries of toil on the land and
in factories, and through dedication to place, family, and God. The
fact that this continuity began with an event you don't like is
immaterial.

Liam:

This disagreement between you makes my point. Under the
exclusivist viewpoint which the two of you ironically share in your
enmity, no solution exists. For each of you, sovereignty must be
absolute. That can't work if we are to stop the bloodletting on our
island. Power must be shared, sovereignty divisible, and identity
flexible all on the same piece of land. Most of Europe has learned to
live this way, as must we.

Sean:

When you say most of Europe, are you talking about Kosovo or
maybe the Basque Country?

Liam:

Those are exceptions, as you well know. Like Northern Ireland, they
are situations where "nation" has too long been equated with "state."
So rather than coexisting and respecting each other's national
aspirations, the people there fight over who has a right to a state. Or
at least, the extremists like you engage in such a struggle, often
dragging a good part of the population along their sectarian paths.

Sean:

You love to pin little labels--extremist, fanatic; I say principled and
dedicated. Your compromising philosophy, your mish mash politics
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lead to states like Yugoslavia, where nationality is repressed only to
emerge in violent chaos. Your federalized European Union could
turn out to be a huge, awful Yugoslavia.
Liam:

Yugoslavia was a communist dictatorship for half a century. Its
economy was strangled by debt. One nation, the Serbs, sought to
dominate the others (or at least the Serbian leadership sought this).
There is no comparison to the emerging multi-polar, prosperous,
democratic Europe. Both nationalists and unionists on our island
could be part of Europe, without sacrificing their identities.

Lou:

I don't like to agree with republicans, but you're wrong and Sean
over here is right. I don't want to be European any more than he
does. I'm British and that's fine with me. He's also right that you
intellectuals see principle and call it extremism. His principles are all
wrong, but at least he has them. With you, it's all love and peace and
we can all be everything, anything, or nothing-Irish, British,
European, Martian, whatever. Nationhood means you've got a
state-and if you're part of that state, you're loyal to its sovereign.
I'm loyal to the British Crown, not to some bureaucrat in Brussels.

Liam:

You've just illustrated the problem. Your idea of sovereignty is
outdated and dangerous. It's outdated because today sovereignty is
divisible. It's not the king or queen who holds it, but the people. And
the people have given some of that power to London, Paris, Dublin,
or Brussels. Your idea is dangerous because it guarantees conflicts.
Indivisible sovereignty means winners and losers, winner take all,
your king or mine. So we bomb each other's houses and pubs in
Belfast and Derry over whose face should be on a postage stamp.

Liam:

The European Union is the best thing to have happened to Ireland in
over two centuries. Europe has given us economic independence
from Great Britain and reinforced the political independence of the
Republic. It has done for Ireland through peaceful evolution what
patriots falsely had hoped Spain or France (or even Germany) could
do through military coalition.

Sean:

You would sacrifice Ireland's independence to your ideal of Europe.
We haven't fought for hundreds of years for an independent Irish
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state just to have it rendered meaningless by ceding its sovereignty to
a Brussels-based bureaucracy.
Liam:

Do you realize that you sound like the reactionaries in the British
Tory Party? You align yourself with the forces of yesterday when
you hardheadedly oppose the European Union. Development aid
from Brussels and trade with our European partners has enabled the
Republic to raise its living standards beyond that of Great Britain.
After centuries of domination, isn't that amazing? You have fought
so long and fanatically for an Irish state that you lose sight of what is
good for the Irish nation.

Sean:

The Irish nation must be the Irish state. Isn't that what decades of
struggle have been all about? Isn't that what our fathers and
grandfathers and their fathers before them shed their blood for?

Liam:

You are too ready to shed blood-that of your comrades' and that of
your perceived enemies as well. The nation and the state are two
different things. We share your longing for a unified Ireland-but it
can exist in a larger Europe. In fact, it is a larger Europe that makes a
unified Ireland more of a possibility.

Sean:

That's double talk, double think.

Liam:

No, it's creative, forward thinking. It is the thinking of reasonable
people willing to compromise. It recognizes that the existence of the
European human rights system and the existence of the European
Union render old ideas of absolute sovereignty meaningless. It
makes it possible for Catholics and Protestants to coexist in Northern
Ireland without either feeling like a disenfranchised minority. The
Good Friday Agreement would not have been possible without this
network of reciprocal human rights protections and divisible, shared
sovereignty made real by the European Union and its member states.

Sean:

Republicans haven't fought for a united Ireland for seventy years just
to have it taken away by your fuzzy political science, by your
European Union.

Liam: You are like a child who is screaming because he cannot get what he
wants. Absolute sovereignty is something of bygone ages. You
oppose the European Union not withstanding all the good that it has
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done for the Republic and the potential good that it offers to
Northern Ireland and the prospect that it offers for the greater
likelihood of unification. You oppose it because it denies the
absolute nature of the nation-state. That state has been the core of
your inflexible ideology that has justified bloodshed for fifty years.
XX. BELFAST

On a gray day in December 1998, a taxi driver named Patrick (really)
took me on a tour of East and West Belfast. East Belfast is predominantly
Protestant whereas West Belfast is predominately Catholic (except for the
Shankill Road district). East Belfast looks quite prosperous and wellmaintained. There are large suburban-looking Tudor homes mingled with
more modest, but still comfortable brick semi-detached houses. No political
murals grace this neighborhood except for those in one less affluent section
of row houses on a predominately Catholic street.
East Belfast is literally the other side of the tracks, under a railroad
bridge and beyond it. The neighborhood mostly still appears solid and tidy, if
the housing is somewhat modest. Even the Falls does not look slummy or
dangerous, just a bit run-down. The Falls and Shankill Road are respectfully
the Catholic and Protestant strongholds of republicanism and loyalism in
working class West Belfast. East Belfast contains a good bit of well-kept
"council housing." This is state-supported public housing, but it appears
better maintained than most "projects" in U.S. cities. In these poorer Belfast
neighborhoods, murals are a common sight on the sides of buildings. They
are more prevalent in nationalist areas (Patrick's word for Catholic). The
wall murals are explicitly pro-IRA and anti-RUC, not merely in the Falls, but
in many of the Catholic neighborhoods in West Belfast.
The Shankill Road is a Protestant enclave in a mostly Catholic West
Belfast. It looks like any other English high street shopping district, with
numerous small retail establishments, pubs, etc. However, less than a block
off the main road are hard-core political murals a bit shocking in their
militancy. Black-hooded loyalist paramilitary figures threateningly hold guns
in these building-side cartoons. The murals in the Falls are similarly strident
in their republican message, but perhaps not quite as menacing in their visual
tone.
As our tour progressed, Patrick gradually revealed himself as a
republican. He agreed that all republicans are nationalists, but not that all
nationalists are republicans. Saying that, he further noted that the definitions
are fuzzy. Generally, nationalists favor a united Ireland while republicans
favor forcing the British out as the only means to that end. He added though,
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that today most republicans believe that a political solution is possible. It
took Patrick about twenty minutes to open up to me, probably waiting to
assure himself that speaking with me could be in no way threatening. He felt
that the working class understood and accepted Europe's role in opening up
possibilities of mixed sovereignty. A further point of interest was his
thoughts on the Irish role in the United States. He expressed pride in such
Scotch-Irish notables as Davy Crockett, Daniel Boone, various signers of the
Declaration of Independence, and U.S. presidents. Patrick seemed to be a
hopeful example of the republican man on the street made optimistic and
moderate by the advent of a peace settlement, but optimism was a more
common currency in 1998 than today.15 8
XXI. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: NATION, BRITISH, IRISH

There are both broad and narrow definitions of nation. Does the Irish
nation include only those of Irish-Catholic, Gaelic background, or does it
include all those who live on the island of Ireland? A narrow, ethnic
definition of "nation" makes dispute settlement more difficult in places like
Ireland and the former Yugoslavia. The broader definition of nation is less
conflict-laden. When one "nation" under the narrow, ethnic definition shares
territory with another, and such group feels a right to have its own state,
conflict is unavoidable.
On the island of Britain, ironically, very few people identify themselves
as British. Their self-identified nationality is usually English, Scottish, or
Welsh. Protestants in Northern Ireland on the other hand often do assert
"Britishness" as their national identity to distinguish themselves from the
Catholic-Irish.
Irish is the legal status of citizens of the Republic of Ireland. It is the
identity claimed by most Catholic residents in Northern Ireland. It is also the
ethnic identity of a vast number of emigrants from Ireland who have settled
in other lands such as America, Canada, and Australia. Finally, some
members of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland would consider
themselves Irish, although this identification has decreased during the
decades of the Troubles.
XXII. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT (HUMAN RIGHTS EXCERPT)
1. The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights
and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the
background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm
158 James J. Friedberg, Field Notes (Dec. 1998) (on file with author).
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in particular:
* the right of free political thought;
" the right to freedom and expression of religion;
" the right to pursue democratically national and political
aspirations;
" the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate
means;
* the right to freely choose one's place of residence;
* the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity,
regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity;
* the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and
* the right of women to full and equal political participation. 159

XXIII. EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IRELAND
European democracies formed the Council of Europe shortly after the
end of the Second World War. 160 While the Council has pursued many broad
purposes toward European peace, unity, and material betterment, the
European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) and the system for
enforcing the Convention have been its dominant achievements. 16 1 Although
the European Union has displaced the Council as the main engine of
European integration, the Council's human rights system, based in
Strasbourg, has played a significant integrating role for the continent. To the
extent that human rights have been an important and effective tool in
implementing and defining limitations on the sovereign state for the
protection of inhabitants' rights, the Strasbourg system of the Council of
Europe, not the Brussels system of the EU, has fulfilled this function more
strongly. Membership in the Council of Europe has been broader than that in
the European Union from the inception of both organizations. 162 Essentially
any European democracy may join the Council without regard to the
complex economic hurdles facing EU applicants. For instance, the new
democracies of Eastern Europe almost immediately joined the Council after
their communist governments fell. Their accession to the European Union,
159 THE AGREEMENT, supranote 1, at 16.
160 EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 122, at 101-02.
161 MARK W. JANIs & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 22-33, 83-

85 (1990).
162 Terminology becomes torturous for the uninitiated. The forty-member "Council
of Europe" should not be confused with the EU bodies, the "Council of the European
Communities" and the "European Council." All fifteen members of the EU are also
members of the Council of Europe.
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however, has been a more arduous task requiring significant economic and
legal reform and development. 163 The Council has never claimed to be
anything other than an international body, that is an organization of states
acting independently, whereas the European Union has progressively, though
ambiguously, sought greater unity through the reduction of state prerogative.
Nonetheless, the Council's human rights system also has reduced
substantially unfettered state prerogative and hence sovereignty.
Britain and Ireland have been members of the Council of Europe and
parties to the European Convention for Human Rights from their
inception. 164 However, because of their domestic legal systems, each nation
has been an imperfect enforcer of European human rights. The rights of the
ECHR are treaty-based obligations that bind each signatory party to each
other party. The natural persons within their jurisdictions are the
beneficiaries of these rights. However, the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland, unlike most other European states, do not have legal systems that
recognize the direct effect of international treaty law. 165 Therefore, until
recently, people within British or Irish jurisdictions could not raise violations
of European human rights in British or Irish courts. Even though Britain or
Ireland may have violated international law by breaching their human rights
treaty obligations, their legal systems did not recognize such treaty breaches
as prohibited by national law. The peace process in Northern Ireland has
promoted greater enforceability of these norms in the Irish and British legal
systems. The Good Friday Agreement included within its web of interstate
and intercommunity obligations a commitment to human rights protection
that would be mutually enforceable throughout the British and Irish Isles.
Negotiators undoubtedly saw this element of the Agreement as necessary to
protect current and potential minorities, whether Irish, British, Protestant, or
Catholic, in any of the jurisdictional territories. The ancillary benefit is
increased human rights protection for all people in Britain and Ireland. 166
The denial of human rights figured importantly in the development of the
conflict in Northern Ireland in the latter half of the twentieth century. As
discussed above, during the 1960s, activists in Derry, Belfast, and elsewhere
163 Nine of these former communist states are scheduled to join the EU in 2004,
more than a decade after they became members of the Council of Europe. See generally
Lockheed Wins $3.5 Billion Poland Plane Pact, CHI. TRI., Dec. 27, 2002, at 3; The
World; With an Eye on EU, Slovaks Elect Moderate, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at 6.

164 JANIS & KAY, supra note 161, at 1.
165 Id. at 34-35.
166 Northern Ireland Act 1998, ch. 47, § 69 (Eng.) (stating that the function of the
Northern Ireland Human Rights commission is to review adequacy and effectiveness of
Northern Ireland law protecting human rights).
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started a civil rights movement, demanding an end to discriminatory
treatment of the Catholic community. Their complaints related to such areas
as employment, housing, education, and policing. This predominately
peaceful movement met with resistance from Protestant establishment in the
North. Radicalization on both sides followed with violence. British military
intervention, initially welcomed by Catholics, proved unsuccessful in
stemming the violence and came to be perceived by the Catholic community
as occupation. The overwhelmingly Protestant composition of the police
force (Royal Ulster Constabulary) reinforced this perception, since British
167
troops often supported the police.
In addition to the initial civil rights issues raised by the early protestors,
new human rights issues came to the fore in light of British military and
policing activities. Investigations over the years have indeed demonstrated
that there were significant instances of human rights violations by the British,
as well as by paramilitary groups, in both the Catholic and Protestant
communities. A number of cases relating to the Troubles in Northern Ireland
found their way to the Commission and Court on Human Rights in
Strasbourg.1

68

For over three decades, Irish republicans have brought suits against the
British government principally challenging detentions and conditions of
confinement and interrogation growing out of the conflict in Northern
Ireland. In doing so, republicans have invoked various protections of the
treaty, principally those related to life, liberty, due process, privacy, search
and seizure, and cruel and inhumane treatment. In fact, the Troubles have
probably been the single largest source for cases and controversies coming
before the Strasbourg court. While the majority of individual counts brought
against the U.K. have probably not been successful, the court has found
against Britain on a sufficient number of claims that one must believe
government behavior has been moderated by the presence of such cases.
Furthermore, this jurisprudence undoubtedly was in the negotiation
consciousness of the parties, who struggled with each other to craft the Good
Friday Agreement, particularly its human rights guarantees.
Subsequent to the Good Friday Agreement, both Britain and Ireland
passed legislation to meet their obligations to incorporate ECHR norms into
the domestic law of Northern Ireland 169 and the Republic' 70 so that
167 HOLLIS,

supra note 3, at 198-204.

33 (Torkel
Opsahl & Thomas Ouchterlony eds., 1974).
169 Human Rights Act 1998, 2000, ch. 42 (Eng.) (extending rights granted by the
GFA not only to Northern Ireland, but also to the entire United Kingdom).
168 FREDE CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
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individuals could rely on such protections in local courts.
Human rights have been a chief tool in dividing and limiting sovereignty
since the end of World War II. The Nuremberg trials, the Universal
Declaration, the U.N. Covenants, and the European Convention system have
all played this role to some degree. Events in Northern Ireland and the peace
process are among the most recent circumstances exemplifying this
phenomenon.
XXIV. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY:

RUC

RUC was the name of the Northern Irish police force prior to November
4, 2001.171 It stood for Royal Ulster Constabulary. While technically open to
Catholics, for most of the decades since the partition, it was overwhelmingly
Protestant. The issue of policing has been a major one in resolving the
conflict in Northern Ireland. As part of the present peace process, the name
Royal Ulster Constabulary has been changed to the Police Service of
Northern Ireland. 172 Nationalists objected to the old name, certainly because
the word Royal implies a Unionist or Loyalist bent in the institution and
possibly also because of the use or misuse of the word "Ulster."
XXV. BORDER
Unionists and British will refer to the boundary between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as the border. On most international maps
it is treated as a border, an international boundary between the state of the
United Kingdom and the state of the Republic of Ireland. Since nationalists
do not recognize the legitimacy of British sovereignty in Northern Ireland,
they will not use the term border to refer to the boundary between the two
entities.
XXVI. A DAY WITH TOM
In July 2003, I spent a day in Coleraine. The town is situated on an inlet
of the northern coast about midway between Derry and Belfast. Thomas
Phillips t73 teaches at the University of Ulster at Coleraine, specializing in the
170 Carol Coulter, Human Rights Convention Passes Into Law, IRISH TIMEs, Jan. 6,
2004, at 7, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File.
171 About PSNI, Police Service
of Northern

Ireland, available
http://www.psni.police.uk/index/about-psni.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
172 Id.
173 A pseudonym.
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non-profit sector. Thus, his expertise comprises detailed knowledge of those
social and civic organizations that often are key players in building civil
society, enabling democratic transition and communal reconciliation. We
discussed such matters, but our conversation wandered much further afield,
as he hosted me for the day, guiding me around his beautiful comer of
Ireland. Tom's views appeared balanced and tolerant, and not sectarian.
The Unionist government was located in the new University of Ulster, in
the small market town of Coleraine in 1964 during the days of the old
Stormont system of Protestant political advantage. Northern Ireland's capital
and largest city, Belfast, already had been the seat of Queens University for
many decades. Derry is the second largest city in Northern Ireland, and the
majority of its population is Catholic. Coleraine is predominantly Protestant.
Thus, critics have charged that the siting of this second university for
Northern Ireland reflected government favoritism toward the Protestant
community.
As we drove through a pleasant seaside town not far from the famous
Giants' Causeway, 174 my host pointed out political symbols I would have
otherwise taken for festive street decoration. Colorful banners flew from
utility poles along the seaside promenade. Tom explained that they were
loyalist emblems, unlawfully displayed on public municipal property, but
countenanced in the face of loyalist militancy by timid (or sympathetic) local
officials. Earlier, as we had driven through a public housing estate, he did not
need to point out to me the proliferation of Union Jacks, further loyalist
banners, and militant graffiti. He obviously thought the tour of such an area
would be educational (although I had seen such displays previously in both
republican and loyalist enclaves in Belfast and Derry). He revealed
disapproval of this culture of extremism.
Thus, my colleague's credibility was high with me, when he explained
what a serious issue decommissioning was to the Protestant community. In
contrast, a few days earlier, a law professor in Galway (an American, but
working in Ireland) accepted the Sinn Fein argument when she insisted to me
that decommissioning was a red herring, thrown across the road by
obstructionist unionists who never wanted power-sharing in the first place
and were pleased to find an excuse to block a cross-community
government. 175 Later that week in Belfast, another academic, who was also
174 The Giants' Causeway is a breathtaking formation of boulders, breakers, and
outcroppings along the seacoast.
175 She also had insisted that the self-determination concession to the people of
Ireland, not decommissioning, was the crucial clause since it kept Sinn Fein in the
Agreement.
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sympathetic to the nationalist community, echoed the same skepticism. Her
skepticism seemed as sincere as Tom's concern. However, I believed Tom
when he insisted that for Protestants, IRA weapons raised a real issue.
Furthermore, the IRA's game of hide and seek, salted with ambiguous
concepts like "beyond use," bred sincere mistrust. Ironically, half a year
later, Tony Blair reversed his position, in frustration with the IRA, and
declared, 'There was a time in Northern Ireland when ambiguity was a
necessary friend. It is now an enemy, an opponent, of this process working."
He cited the IRA's failure to disarm and renounce violence as the single
biggest obstacle to peace, in the wake of the electoral success of hardline
parties from both communities at the expense of both nationalist and unionist
76
moderates. 1
The British government has now acknowledged what Tom quietly told
me last summer-trust is a very real reconciliation issue here, and for the
unionist community, IRA disarmament and clarity of commitment must
replace ambiguity and contingent reassurances.
XXVII. DIALOGUE 4
Lou:

The parades celebrate our culture and history. William of Orange
freed the British Isles from Stuart dictatorship. His victories over
James made it possible for parliamentary democracy to triumph. We
have every reason to remember and honor these profound historic
events.

Liam:

The truest word in your little speech was "triumph." The Orange
Order parades, the Apprentice Boys' march represent triumphalism
more than anything else. They are the boot on the neck.
Parliamentary democracy's got nothing to do with it, domination's
everything. With every drum beat, every bagpipe note, you celebrate
the domination of the Protestant community over the Catholics, the
theft of our land, and the exile of our people.

Lou:

Every credible historic account recognizes that the Glorious
Revolution of 1689, when the parliamentarians under William
defeated the Stuart tyrants, was a major step toward a democratic and
modem western civilization. However, even if you insist on denying
this historical truth, what right have you to prevent me from
expressing it? You, who have whined for decades about purported
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See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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denial of your civil rights, now seek to limit my basic freedom of
expression.
Liam:

But you want to express yourself in my front yard. It is like burning a
cross in my garden. Your marches route through Catholic
neighborhoods. Your drums and bugles and shouts taunt with bad
music and worse, history. That's not free expression. That's
incitement.

Mary:

I have no wish to move either of you away from your core beliefs. Or
perhaps I do; but I know it would be fruitless to start with such an
attempt. It is better if we can at least agree that we don't want our
young men killing each other and don't want our pubs and homes
fire-bombed. If the parades are to go forward, let's at least keep them
from destroying our towns and cities.

Lou:

How would you propose that? It's the republican kids that start the
trouble-throwing stones while we are peaceably marching.

Mary: I have to agree with Liam on one point. You cross a line at some
point between expression and provocation. Let me propose some
limited rules that would protect the former and prevent the latter.
Paraders should have the freedom to march, but the communities
should engage in negotiation concerning certain details.
Liam: That is what we have been asking. They shouldn't be allowed to
march past Catholic neighborhoods.
Mary:

That might be possible in some circumstances, but where our
communities are back-to-back with each other, it is not always.
However, we know there are certain symbols, particular flags and
songs, that are the most triumphalist. Generally, the police must
protect the parades, but there may be particular junctures where, by
mutual agreement, these most provocative gestures are withheld.
Reciprocally, the nationalist community must agree to control its
young people-no stones, no curses, no threatening surges against
police lines. People of good faith and peace must meet and agree on
these rules beforehand. We must be in the crowds together making
sure they are followed. We don't have to agree on a united Ireland or
a divided one in order to agree that bricks and flames are bad for all
of us.
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XXVII. A DAY IN DERRY 177
Bus coaches from all over Northern Ireland (and a few from Scotland)
roll into Derry in early August for the Apprentice Boys' march. The bands
further parade at their home locations before and after this event. In the year
2000, I spent the day observing this parade, hosted by Dominic Bryan, a
lecturer at Queen's University in Belfast and an expert on parades and their
accompanying political and social issues in Northern Ireland. The Apprentice
Boys' parades are distinct from those of the Orange Order. While both
organizations are Protestant, loyalist, and fraternal groups, the Apprentice
Boys seem to have evolved into a slightly less strident organization than the
Orange Order.
The Apprentice Boys have made some effort to compromise and stage
peaceful events. Their parades are linked to a single historical event: the
semi-mythical closing of the gates of Derry by Protestant teenage guild
apprentices just in time to avoid the approaching onslaught of Catholic troops
under King James. Reciprocally, Derry Catholics, now being a majority, may
feel less threatened and themselves more willing to reach accommodation
with the loyalist marchers in order to avoid bloodshed.
Dominic Bryan, who has written extensively on parades (often with
colleague Neil Jarman), has been consulted by the British government and
has been involved in the training of parade marshals for the Apprentice
Boys' event. He and Jarman came up with the idea of marshals/observers,
drawing on the practice of t-shirted security folk at rock concerts. Dominic's
Ph.D. is in anthropology. His political interest is in "measured and sensible"
policing. Dominic and I met at an appointed street corner in Derry early in
the morning before commencement of the parade. The first official event to
take place in the old city was an early morning pageant. After the pageant,
participants proceeded to march around the wall. The pageant reenacted the
siege of Derry in 1689, with Williamite Protestants holding out against the
massed forces of James' army. Dominic offered his opinion that the recent
addition of the theatrical pageant is a good thing because it makes the day
less militaristic and more commemorative. Perhaps the worst thing about the
pageant was the horrendous acting and embarrassing amateurism.
The march around the wall has been contentious in the past, especially
on the Bogside portion, where Catholic residents have rioted in earlier years.
Dominic expressed optimism that the compromise negotiations should help
177 Friedberg, supra note 121. The information in this section comes from direct
observation of the August 12, 2000, Apprentice Boys' march or from conversations with
Dominic Bryan.

168

AMBIGUITY, SOVEREIGNTY, IDENTITY

preserve the peace. Today, a Catholic population overwhelmingly dominates
the Derry side of the river, which includes the old walled city where most
parade events are held. The walled city has few Protestant residents. The area
has turned mostly commercial and seems to be busy primarily during the day.
According to Dominic, a number of Protestant institutions, such as churches,
pubs, and fraternal buildings, have survived within the old city walls. Most
Protestants live south of the river where the parade begins and ends. Over
one hundred forty bands and marchers proceed from there to the "diamond,"
the central square in the old city, and then back to the bridge. The main
parade, with bands, takes about four hours, between noon and 4:00 p.m.
Dominic greets many contacts as we move through the streets-from the
Parade's Commission to fellow academics and community people. They tend
to be conciliatory, pro-peace types, both Catholic and Protestant. (Dominic
himself is English, but Catholic.)
A friend of Dominic, a social psychologist named Cliff, spends the day
with us. Cliff grew up and lives in Omagh. During a break over coffee at a
bakery on Waterloo Street, Cliff talks to me about the Omagh bombing a
year or so before by the splinter republican group, the "Real IRA." Everyone
at the table agrees that the Omagh tragedy consolidated (or affirmed) a clear
anti-violence majority throughout Northern Ireland. Cliff speaks of being on
a bus going home to Omagh at the time of the bombing and of seeing police
crying at the bus station.
During the same conversation over coffee, Dominic relates a joke told to
him by a South African Jewish friend saying that the three political situations
are like three marriages. In South Africa the spouse dies, in Israel and
Palestine the couple gets a divorce, and in Northern Ireland, the couple
undergoes eternal marriage counseling.
After coffee, we walked to the bridge to catch the beginning of the
parade. More spectators have now filled the streets by late morning,
conveying a holiday atmosphere. We walk along with the early bands
through the city to the diamond, in which the atmosphere becomes tenser, but
still orderly for the most part. Lots of police are in sight, most are not armed
or armored. However, after the accumulation of a number of nationalist
youths, special police in riot gear, though without helmets or shields, do
appear. Over a couple of hours spent at the diamond, nothing serious occurs,
though we do observe a few small incidents. A nationalist teenage girl will
not move off a barrier when asked to do so by a woman police officer. As
soon as couple of large, male cops approach her, however, she jumps right
off. When nationalist kids seem to surge a bit, police react by moving
personnel and blocking the migration of the group. Dominic says the adults
in the nationalist community seem to be following the agreement to not
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disturb the march. Some, in fact, are actively calming their own angry
youths. We seem to be stationed at the edge of two groups, republican and
loyalist. A few loyalist women come on to sing some rather aesthetically
unpleasing marshal songs for a few minutes. The only minor violence we
observe occurs near the end. Protestant paraders from Portadown play music
in the diamond, apparently against the rules of negotiated compromise. A
bottle is thrown at the band from the nationalist crowd. Some members surge
to fight, while the police and others in the band restrain them. The result is
just a couple of minor scuffles. After the march, we relax in a pub with seven
or eight others, mostly observers of the parade like Dominic. Everyone seems
pleased that the negotiated cross-community work seems to have resulted in
a violence-free day.
XXIX. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: DERRY/LONDONDERRY

Catholics call the second largest city in Northern Ireland "Derry." The
official name within the United Kingdom is Londonderry. The longer name
reflects a connection that the Protestants settlers and residents of the town
feel toward the British Empire.
XXX. DERRY
Tuesday night, July 29, 2003
The streets of central Derry, particularly inside the old city walls, are
almost totally deserted at night. Although there are a lot of shops, restaurants,
and commercial activities during the day, nothing is happening in the
evening except for inside a few pubs. In the Catholic neighborhood just
outside the walls of the city, the shops within the walls seem uniformly
closed, except for a few pubs along the strip that is the commercial area
above the Bogside. Earlier, I searched for the Italian restaurant that I had
eaten at a few years earlier on a block just outside the walls, pretty much on
the opposite side from the Bogside. I found it. I talked to the proprietor who
had moved from Abruzzi about eight or nine years ago. He said he came to
Derry after the 1994 truce, apparently anticipating an upturn in the economy
and demand for fine restaurants. He observed that the economy has improved
in the last few years due to the peace, notwithstanding the non-functioning of
the Stormont legislature; apparently the peace process is having positive
economic effects if this restaurateur is to be believed. He also indicates that a
big difference is that people up here are willing to work harder now; they
used to be just seeking handouts from the government. One does not know to
what extent this is accurate or just the skewed perception of a small
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businessman who does not believe anybody in the world works as hard as
small businessmen.
XXXI. VOCABULARY AND AMBIGUITY: WAR

The Irish Republican Army insists that its actions of violence in Northern
Ireland are those of a war. In their view, this is a war against the British
Army. They ignore, however, certain legal characteristics of war in making
such a claim, such as the limits on warfare placed by the Geneva
Conventions, which have been signed by almost all the nations of the world
and have become customary law. Under the Geneva Conventions, the attacks
carried on by the IRA, as well as those carried on by the Protestant Loyalists
militias, would clearly be illegal under international law. 17 8 Thus, the
perpetrators of acts such as the bombing of homes, or pubs, or assassinations
would be war criminals. The status of the Northern Ireland conflict as a war
or not also impacts the imprisonment of paramilitary perpetrators. The IRA
and other outlawed militias have insisted that the inmates within British jails
that are part of their membership should be treated as prisoners of war and
not as common criminals. Such a status would imply rights such as not
having to wear prison uniforms and not having to accept certain work
assignments, as well as other Geneva Convention-type rights of prisoners of
war. Disputes over this issue have been quite significant in a number of
contexts, including the hunger strike of the early 1980s.
XXXII. MOMS' MARCHES
Mary:

None of your causes are worth one more dead son, one more maimed
nephew.

Betty:

None of them.

Sean:

(addressing Mary) This is a war. People get hurt. People die. We are
fighting to liberate a nation. Your humane words are, at best,
weakness in the face of tyranny. At worst they are treason.

Mary:

I recognize that as a threat. We are not afraid of your threats
anymore. The decent people in the middle, we mothers and wives,
are tired of seeing our innocents blown up. Your fanatic ideals

178 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-290.
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cannot keep us company at the dinner table, comfort us when we are
sad, nurse us when we are sick. We are tired of losing our families to
your fanatic abstractions.
Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan, a Catholic and a Protestant
homemaker respectively, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976.179 For a short
time, it appeared possible that their Northern Ireland Peace Movement would
unite the majority of people in Northern Ireland, Catholic and Protestant, and
force the Loyalists and Republican paramilitarists into retreat. This particular
thrust for peace and reconciliation failed as extremists continued their
bombings and murders, the British government continued its policy of
180
internment without trial, and the IRA launched its prison hunger strikes.
However, the efforts of Mrs. Williams and Mrs. Corrigan may have planted a
seed that germinated only two decades later.
XXXIII. CONCLUSION
Poem lyrics of "The Lake Isle of Innisfree" by William Butler Yeats:
I will arise and go now, and go to Innisfree,
And a small cabin build there, of clay and wattles made:
Nine bean-rows will I have there, a hive for the honeybee;
And live alone in the bee-loud glade.
And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow;
Dropping from the veils of the mourning to where the cricket sings;
There midnight's all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow,
And evening full of the linnet's wings.
I will arise and go now, for always night and day
I hear lake water lapping with low sounds by the shore;
While I stand on the roadway, or on the pavements grey,
I hear it in the deep heart's core. 18 1
Students of the Troubles and subsequent peace processes in Northern
Ireland have on occasion borrowed Yeats' line "peace comes dropping slow"
to reflect poetically on the search for resolution to the Northern Ireland crisis.
From a standpoint of interpretative purity, these observers have gotten it a
179 The Nobel Peace Prize 1976, supra note 128.
180 DIXON, supra note 25, at 180-87, 204-07; Robert P. Connolly, Mothers Built
Bridges to Irish Accord, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 17, 2000, at 29, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Bherld File.
181 DANIEL HALPERN, HOLY FIRE: NINE VISIONARY POETS AND THE QUEST FOR

ENLIGHTMENT 186 (Harper Perennial 1994).
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little wrong. As seen from the entire poem, Yeats was not primarily focused
on peace as the ending to war, but more on a Thoreau-like pastoral longing.
Notwithstanding this strain on literary context, the words seem to work
nicely in their patient hopefulness, in their ambiguity, and in their source: a
nationalist Irish poet with an Anglican background.
Ambiguity has aided both the Republic of Ireland's transition to
democracy and the formative stages of the peace process in Northern Ireland.
In the case of the Republic, lack of clarity surrounding its sovereign status in
earlier decades enabled it to evolve away from the British Crown and to
establish democracy without interference from the former imperial power. In
the case of Northern Ireland, negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement in
1998 was made possible only through a new ambiguity regarding identity
and sovereignty. The Agreement recognized that residents of the North need
not be forced to choose between being British or Irish unless they wish to do
so. In any event, a person's identity, whether unitary or mixed, would not
prevent her from enjoying equal rights in the territory. Furthermore,
sovereignty was recognized as divisible, with the Agreement creating shared
jurisdictions across communities, across the north-south border, and across
the Irish Sea between Ireland and Britain.
Although beneficial in the formative stage of the peace process,
ambiguity has proved deleterious at the implementation stage. Trust has
suffered. And it is trust that the nationalist and unionist communities need in
each other in order for the peace process to triumph. Republicans have
exploited the ambiguity surrounding the process of decommissioning
weapons and loyalists have exploited the uncertainty regarding powersharing obligations. Both extreme camps have alienated would-be moderates
on the other side and caused the polarization evidenced in the November
2003 elections. For the sake of Ireland, ambiguities that soften exclusivist
claims must be preserved, but those which seek cynical and one-sided
advantage must be purged.
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